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1.

INTRODUCTION
This paper is in no way meant to be a
comparative study
of the two Napoleons.

The methods and strategies of Napoleon

are given merely as background material
to 1870.

Napoleon

I

I

was not perfect in his use of the tools and
techniques of his
profession, particularly during the later campaigns.
Yet the

fact remains that Bonaparte probably possessed
one of the most

outstanding military minds in history and used it to
help
France reach her pinnacle of power in Europe during
the early
19th century.

The question to be answered is how this same

nation could be so quickly and thoroughly beaten a little
more
than fifty years later, in 1870.

One of the obvious answers

seems to be that France in 1870 lacked a military leader of
the stature of Napoleon Bonaparte.

But other questions arise.

For example, given the lack of an outstanding military leader

in 1870, what had happened to the military formula with which

Napoleon

I

had successfully dominated Europe?

During the

preceding years, how had the French leaders built and advanced
the Napoleonic tradition and strategy?

In addition, it is

necessary to take at least a surface look at their opponents,
the Prussian military.

How had the Prussian leaders been

affected by their defeats in 1806 at the hands of Napoleon I?

Had it been these defeats that encouraged the Prussian leaders
to develop new tactics which they were to use against the

French in 1870?
These, then, are a few of the aspects which must be con-

sidered in a historical analysis of the reasons for the fail-

the French military in 1870,

NAPOLEONIC ARMIES
The most distant cause of the
French defeat in 1870
probably occurred in 1806, Not
only had Napoleon I encouraged the growth of German
nationalism with his policy
toward the Germanic states, but
he had showed the German
leaders, particularly the Prussians,
the methods which were
necessary to continue national
sovereignty,
lliroughout the

early Napoleonic Era, Prussia, under
Frederick William in,
had successfully kept its neutrality;
but when in 1806 it
was discovered that an aggressive
Napoleon I had other plans
for the Prussian state, making
it a satellite in reality,

friction between the two powers resulted
in war.
At this time the Prussian army was a
perfect example
of how 18th century armies trained and
organized. The organ-

ization of the Prussian army was based on
the well-disciplined,

long-serving soldier led by army officers who in
many cases
had strong faith in a defensive style of fighting.
This

Prussian army in 1806 opposed a French national army
which,
on the whole, was led by those having patriotic
feelings and
an officer corps which believed in quick,
thrusting offenses.

Napoleon used the technique of the sudden stroke into the
enemy's weak area, which he had previously perfected in Italy
and Austria against the Prussians in 1806.

1,

1

Ferdinand Schevill, A History of Europe . New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951, p. 433. Here
after cited as Schevill, Europe .

4.

In general, the excessive
emphasis on one type of
strategy has often proven
disastrous. This was the
case of
the Prussian leaders
in 1806, when they failed
to remain
flexible enough to alter
their plans to fit the
changing
conditions of the various
situations they faced.
Prince

Louis at Saalfeld, and
Tauentzien near Jena, both
made defeat
xnevitable because they insisted
on imitating the oblique'
order of battle of Predericlc
the Great.
The Prussians at
this time did not consider
numerical superiority a prerequisite for Victory while
Napoleon had earlier
used the prin-

ciple of superiority of numbers
very successfully and thus
had great faith in it. At
Jena. October 14, 1806. Prince

Hohenlohe mistakenly decided to
oppose Bonaparte's 65,000
men with his army of 35,000.
Almost complete destruction
resulted and the Prince could no
longer be considered in
3
command of a fighting force.
In 1807 a treaty was signed
between Napoleon and Prussia in which the latter became a
virtual satellite,
Prussia,
as a result, lost half of its
territory, had to pay a huge

indemnity, had to pay for the occupation
of French troops,

2.

Oblique movement into battle means that
the attacking
torce moves in a direction that is diagonal
to its
column movement, thereby making the point
between
Its tlank and front its first assault element.

3.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War . London: Paul,
Trench, Trubner
Company, Vol, I, 1940, pp. 129, 196, and 258. Hereatter cited as Clausewitz, On War.

5,

and was forced to lindt its
military forces to 43,000 men/
The period from 1806 to the
French retreat from Russia

in 1812 gave many of the Prussian
leaders the time to reexamine their defeat of 1806. These
leaders eventually got
the conservative William III to
agree to certain social and
political reforms. These reforms, first
led by stein and
later by Hardenberg, abolished feudalism
and led to much

greater social mobility.

Thig also resulted in a reorgan-

ization of the army along lines similar
to the French army.
This reorganization resulted in universal
conscription and
the lessening of the extreme use
of discipline.

A national

militia, the Landwehr, which allowed the
Prussians to put
over 200,000 troops in the field to
oppose Napoleon I at
a later date, was also created in
1813.

6

Even though

Napoleon had limited the Prussian army to
43,000 men, the
Prussian leaders, led by Scharnhorst, were able
to circumvent
this ruling by replacing the entire 43,000 men with
an en-

tirely new army each time the first group had successfully

completed the minimum requirements of training.

7

Whitton, The Decis ive Battles of Modern Times .
Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1923, p. 63.
Hereafter cited as Whitton, Decisive Battles .

4.

F. E.

5.

Landwehr literally means "landguard" and was made up
basically of most men who had served in the army
and reserve and were still under 45 years old.

6.

Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army: 16401945 . New York: Oxford University Press, 1956,
Hereafter cited as Craig, Politics .
p, 141.

7.

Schevill, Europe ,

p.

442,

6.

Not all the credit should be given
to Napoleon for his
frequent victories because he often
benefited from the errors
and mistakes of his opponents.
Similar to the Prussian
mistake at Jena in 1806, was the Austrian
failure in 1809
to reinforce their troops after
the battle of Aspern.
since
the Austrians could have brought
three times as many reinforce

ments into the field as Napoleon did during
this interval
period, their failure to do so proved a great
disadvantage
during the battle that followed at Wagram.
In both the battles of Ratisbonne and Wagram,
Bonaparte

vigorously attacked with his right wing, leaving his
left

wing to hold a defensive position.

Although Archduke Charles

of Austria used the same tactics, he lacked the
stubborjiess

and vitality of Napoleon»s forces, and thus the few
units

which gained their objectives were nothing when
compared to
the decisive victories of Napoleon's right wing.

During the

battle of Wagram the Austrians attacked Bonaparte's weak
left
flank with the majority of their forces.

Meanwhile his right

wing successfully defeated and turned the Austrian left flank.
With strong reserves to the rear, he prevented the Austrian
successes on his left side from hindering his total victory
by his right wing at Rossbach.

Later he combined his forces
8

to re-take Aderklaa, which had been lost by his left flank.

8o

Clausewitz, On War .

Vol. Ill, pp. 217, and 187-189.

7.

Napoleon I«s plan for a march into
Russia in 1812
might seem imprudent on the
surface, but this was not the
case.
His plan for defeating the
Russian

armies and finally

occupying their capital of Moscow
would, he believed, ultimately force the Emperor
Alexander

to sign a peace treaty.

This had proven to be the case
with the Prussians after the
battle of Friedland in 1807, and
again with the Austrian

Emperor Francis after the battle of
Austerlitz in 1805, and
later after the battle of Wagram
in 1809. Although Napoleon
knew the chance he was about to
take
might lead to a strat-

egic defeat, he was fully aware
of the precedent that had
been established and, therefore,
took the gamble he felt

necessary.

Wapoleon»s character and previous actions

could have offered enough foreshadowing
reasons

why he

might have accepted this favorable gamble.
This calculated risk resulted in Napoleon's
defeat
in Russia and in addition after 1812 the
allies, not in-

cluding Russia, could put approximately
725,000 troops in
the field to oppose Napoleon.

France at any time during

the First Empire did not have that number
of troops under
arras.

By late 1812 only one- third of Napoleon's troops
were

French, while the majority had been recruited from the
10

countries he had occupied.

9.

Clausewitz, On War .

10. Clausewitz, On War .

Vol. I, p. 149.
Vol. Ill, p. 171.

8.

Dur^ing most of Napoleon's marches,
with the major ex-

ception^ the march to Russia in 1812, his
troops seldom
suffered from lack of provisions, since they
would often,
as in the march from the Adige to the
Lower Danube, take

whatever they needed from the countryside.
Besides relying on the ability of his troops to find
provisions. Napoleon depended upon his advance guard
a great
deal.
Since he needed to alter his tactics from
time to

time, it was necessary for the advance guard
to provide the

information needed.

Aside from this, Bonaparte made the

ma:ximum use of his advance guard to keep comrauni
cations

open among his many units.

His use of cavalry in this

manner was quite extensive, but he seems to have depended
a great deal more on having greater numbers of infantrymen

rather than cavalrymen, for ultimate victory in battle.

Once

his cavalry had been started into the attack they could not
be maneuvered and usually became wasted after attacking for
12

more than 1500 yards.
On the other side, Napoleon oft-n used his artillery

whenever possible.

Kis success at massing and concentrat-

ing his artillery often depended upon the type of terrain
13

and the accuracy of his shells at a range of about 300 yards.

11. Clausewitz, On War .

Vol. II, p. 93.

12. Ibid., pp. 21, and 42-43.
13. Ibid ., p. 22.

9.

During the era of Napoleon

I

the moveraent of artillery to
a

more desirable position would often
depend on the firmness
of the earth, thereby allowing the
field pieces to be moved
into position.
For this reason Napoleon was unable
to break
through the British lines at Waterloo/^

Bonaparte frequently waited for the course
of a battle
to develop before he committed his
artillery,
in this way

he could move the massed pieces to the
desired location

with the result that the artillery then
became the decisive
factor of the battle. Tlie opposite of this
tactic was the

combination of massed concentrated artillery that
Napoleon
used to stop or hinder the advance of an enemy
by a heavy

bombardment, thereby giving his troops the time to
decide
the right opportunity for victory.

The allied leaders

were sometimes slow to learn from the old master, but in
the battle of Leipzig when their massed guns surprised

Napoleon by opening fire, he commented, "At last they have
15

learned something."
It becomes obvious that Napoleon, during his later

campaigns, lost much of the zest and detailed precision that
he had earlier shown.

At this time he began to rely more on

his own ability to master his opponents.

At Kulm, in August

1813, he ordered Vandamrae's column, unsupported, to cut off

14, Clausewitz, On War .

Vol, I, p, xi.

15, Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe Ingelfingen, Letters on Artillery . London: Stanford, 1893, pp. 130, and 127Hereafter cited as Hohenlohe, Artillery ,
128,

10.

the retreat of the Prussians and Austrians
from Dresden,

The French column was destroyed because
Napoleon had for16
gotten about it.
It seems that after 1806 Napoleon

I

used his imperial

position to guarantee his greater numbers on the battle
field.

This reliance on numerical superiority resulted

in his emphasis on the sheer weight of his forces
rather
than using the surprise and mobility he had used
earlier.

This tactic can be observed when he later emphasizes con-

centrated artillery fire to soften a point in his adversary's
defenses before he launched his attack.

His final defeat may

have been caused by his failure to be frugal with his superior numbers, and his failure to make use of surprise and

mobility,

Bonaparte's strategy of attacking an enemy's weak

spot had been established much earlier, but Napoleon's

later dependence on the massing of enough troops to make
a weak spot in his opponent's defensive line was a corrupt-

ion of this military principle.

The real power of concent-

rating a force at an enemy's weak point lies in the use of
a flexible policy of mobility and not merely in the density

of one's troops.
of Napoleon

I

The loss of this flexibility on the part

has been greatly overlooked and hidden by
17

what later grew to be the Napoleonic legend.

16, Clausewitz, On War ,

Vol, I, p, 219,

17. Liddell Hart, The Ghost of Napoleon ,
New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1935, pp. 102-103, Hereafter
cited as Hart, The Ghost.

11.

The Prussians during the battles of Lutzen
and Bautzen

put into the field a well-disciplined

array

of 150,000.

in

1913

After

these engagements Napoleon considered the
Prussian troops

his most dangerous rivals and by the importance
their role
played in his defeat at Leipzig it would seem that
his

prophecy was well founded.
Yet when the Prussian and Russian armies met
Napoleon
at the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen in May,
1813, he suc-

cessfully won both engagements because of his own great

military prowess.

The fact remained, however, that he

fully realized that these defeats were in no way similar
to the crushing defeats of Jena and Friedland.

The oppos-

ing forces retreated in an orderly fashion and Napoleon

commented that with the great losses of the French^a few
more victories like those, would mean ultimate defeat for
19

France.
Thus, we have seen the very game of numbers^ that Napoleon

had played so well previously^ later being used against him.
The Prussians had learned their lessons well, and even though
there was a short period of Prussian reversal back to the old

tradition of a professional army, Prussia was again to apply

what it had learned at a later date, to its advantage.

In

view of the German developments after 1806 it is interesting

18. Whitton, Decisive Battles ,
19.

Schevill, Europe ,

p. 344.

p. 63.

12.

that the French,

the first to use national armies
in Europe,

fell back in 1870 to a complete reliance
on the very thing
the Prussians found necessary to
replace in 1806, the long
service soldiers of a professional army.

This lesson of Napoleon I, v.hich had been
so quickly
absorbed by the Prussians in 1807, in
general, was refuted
by many of the leading French military
minds during the
1860's.

One of the foremost French strategists of
this period,

Ardant du Picq, was quoted as saying, "In
these days of perfected long arms of destruction, a small force....

by a happy

combination of good sense or genius with morale or
appliances,
may secure heroic victories over a great force
similarly

armed.

What good is an army of two hundred thousand men
of

whom only one half really fight, while the other one hundred
thousand disappear in a hundred ways?"

20

To even the most casual reader it becomes evident that
if this view represented that of a sizable element of the

French military leadership in the 1860 's, which it did, the

conclusion could only be that they had not benefited from their
own historical experiences.

The following material will con-

sider why both the French and the Prussians either adopted,
or failed to adopt, not only universal conscription, but also

various other technological and organizational developments

within their milit.ary organizations.

20. Edward M. Earle (ed.). Makers of Mo der n Strategy .
Prince
ton: Princeton University Press, 1948, p. 215.
Hereafter cited as Earle, Modern Str ategy.

13.

CHANGES FROM NAPOLEON I TO 1870
CHANGES IN PRUSSIA
It is incorrect to think that
Prussia merely imitated
the military institutions of
Napoleon

I

since, in reality,

they superimposed their existing
military tradition on thi
Napoleonic system. Unlike the French
during the years that

followed Napoleon Bonaparte, the
Prussians after 1860 did
not allow the hiring of a
substitute

to take one»s place in

the army.

They thus established the foundation
of their

army upon the concept of true
universal conscription.^^

Between 1815 and 1860 the law of
universal conscription
was not stringently enforced in
Prussia, but when William Ijami
came to power he saw the future
necessity of war
if Prussia

was to unite the various Germanic states.

Because of this

William enlarged the yearly draft from
40,000 to 60,000 men
while stipulating that the minimum active
service would last
for three years.

After each soldier had served his active

time, he was expected to serve an additional
two years in the

reserve.

William

I

and Albrecht von Roon, Minister of War,

supported an increase in this reserve status to four
years,
thus guaranteeing a Prussian army of 400,000 men.

The lower

house of the Prussian Diet refused to support these military
A

retorms either fincTtially or legislatively.

22

21. A. V. Boguslawski, Tactical Deductions From the War of 1870
1871 . Kansas: Spooner, 1878, p. 22. Hereafter cited
as Boguslawski, Tactical Deductions .

22. James T. Shotwell , History of Western Europe . New York:
Ginn and Company, 1946, p. 661, Hereafter cited
as Shotwell, Western Europe .

14.

Despite this resistance, Bisraarck and von
Roon, through
devious methods, went about reforming the
military areas
they considered important while terrorizing
many of the

Liberals in the parliament.

This is

just'^'^Spposi te

of what

occurred in France, when during the 1860
»s the heads of
government gave concessions to the Liberals in

the area of

military reform.

With the support of William, Bismarck and

von Roon in Prussia continued their plan of
strengthening
the array in complete defiance of the lower
house.

The final

step in these developments took place when General
von Moltke,
one of the most scientific military minds of the
19th century,

took command of the Prussian array.

As with all other types of raachines, the military organ-

ization must periodically be overhauled to adjust to various
new developments.

The armies of Frederick the Great were

found to be obsolete at Jena, and so too was Scharnhorst »s

organization during the mobilizations of 1848 and 1859,

Moltke helped to successfully bring about various needed
reforms in 1860, by making universal conscription the duty of
the entire nation.

After the war against Austria in 1866, all

of the States in the Northern German Confederation with Bavaria

and Wurtemburg, adopted the Prussian military system and thus
23

set the basis for the standardization of one German

Thus the Prussian

array

array.

stood ready; a large, well-oiled,

machine ready to lunge forward at the

cotiiraand

of its masters.

London: Macmillan
23. E, A. Altham, The Principles of War .
Company, 1914, p. 14. Hereafter cited as Altham,

Principles .

15.

At the start of the war in 1870, the Prussian general
staff, supporting the views of Moltke, intended, as much
as possible,

to limit both

Bismarck *s and von Roon's control

over the military movements during the conflict,

Bismarck

was not even told of the German military plans after the
fall of Sedan,

as a result, Bismarck later complained that

the Prussian military movements frequently hindered his
24
diplomatic dealings with the French,
Moltke believed that

there was no reason why his military operations should be

interrupted by diplomatic considerations.

The days were

gone when Napoleon I*s military officers were also "general-

diplomats", who received detailed accounts of military in25

formation.

Napoleon

I

had felt, when at all possible during times

of peace, as many military officers as possible should gain

combat experience with foreign armies.

No matter how many

officers gained this experience those who did would prove to
be an asset in future campaigns.

This was no t^ necessary in

France during the Second Empire since its own foreign wars

provided a means for French officers to gain war experiences.
On the other hand, Prussia used this Napoleonic principle by

24, Gordon, Politics ,

pp, 204-205.

Greenwhich:
25, Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism .
Meridian Books, 1959, p, 180, Hereafter cited
as Vagts, Militarism ,

16.

sending many of its officers, including von Moltke, to Turkey
and Syria, while von Goeben went to Spain to gain the nrac26

tical experiences of war.

By 1870 these experiences proved

to be a limiting factor to the French tactics and style of

fighting, while having the opposite effect on the Prussians
and causing them to greatly advance their thinking in military

strategy.
Von Moltke, the Prussian comsiander, might be considered
the next military genius to come upon the European scene

after Napoleon I.

There were many more similarities between

Moltke and Napoleon

I

III and his uncle.

Although Moltke never wrote of military

than had ever existed between Napoleon

strategy as such, his brilliance was based on his search for

new developments in modern warfare.

It was left for Moltke

to develop strategic timing as a newly formulated concept;

a systematical use of railroads for military use, the use of

the telegraph in war, a superior training system that em-

phasized the reliance on subordinate officers, and, finally,
the advantages of envelooment and concentric advance while
27
using increased range and ease of troop movement.
Napoleon
I

would probably have had some difficulty in developing the

emphasis on subordinate officers; but the rest of Moltke *s

developments were often the logical outcome of Bonaparte *s

26. Clausewitz, On War .

Vol. I, p. 83.

27. A. L. Conger,"Moltke's Plans of Campaign," The Military
Historian and Economist . Vol. I, No. 3, July 1916,
Hereafter cited as Conger, Moltke *s Flans .
p, 298,

17.

views Which concerned the bringing
of a large part of his
force to bear upon only the minor
force of his opponent,
and by massing the troops in a
location in which they could
be quickly brought to bear in
important positions
on the

battlefield.
The Prussians had also started the
development of a

general staff to work out geographical
problems even before
1806.
After their defeat at Jena, Scharnhorst
led the re-

form that added supporting troops to
this administrative
agency.

During the period between the 1820 s and
the late

1840 »s, the control of this staff remained in the
hands of
the minister of war.

Only under von Moltke did the full

possibilities of the general staff develop completely, culminating finally with the separation of direct power
of the

war ministry from the general staff.

This division was not

entirely due to the brilliance of von Moltke, but was due

primarily to the fact that most Prussians realized the importance of a centralized organization which could direct
the new technological innovations in times of stress- that
28
IS, use of railroads, and movement of artillery.
When von

Moltke took command in 1857 he started to make detailed plans
as to how railroads could be used to their best advantage in

times of war.

28. Dallas D,

Through the structure of the general staff

Irvine, "The Origins of Capital Staffs," The
Journal of Modern History . Vol, X, No. 2, June
1938, p, 178, Hereaf ter cited as Irvine, Capital
Staffs,

18.

he organized a railroad system by 1867 that was entirely

independent of the regular system and could be used for
any purpose desired by the general staff.

The Prussian general staff, like Napoleon Bonaparte^

realized the importance of rifle power.

Napoleon

I

had

established the principle: "The firearm is everything, the
29

rest is nothing,"

This comment summed up the Prussian

attitude toward rifle practice.

The military leaders tried

to train the individual Prussian soldier so well in rifle

practice that, when he found himself under battlefield conditions, he would not make some of the glaring errors that

had been made formerly, such as not even aiming at an enemy
assault force before firing.
The Prussian general staff planned the war with France
in great detail, yet the plan remained, to a large extent,
as flexible as possible due to the strong belief in change

by von Moltke.

Von Moltke*s plan, as was agreed to by the

King, was, above all things, based on a quick capture of the

French capital, which he considered to be more important in
France than in most other countries.

While the Prussian

troops were to drive the French forces toward Paris, they

were also to try to keep the French forces out of the fertile southern states, while limiting them to a narrow tract

in the north as much as possible,

29. Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe Ingelfingen, Letters on Infantry . London: Stanford, 1889, p. 34, Kereafter cited as Hohenlohe, Infantry ,

19.

The general theme of the German plan was based
on the

resolution to attack the French at once, wherever
they were
found, while trying to keep the German troops
as completely

compact as possible so that the Prussians could
always bring
a superior force into the field.

These general plans were

usually left to the various commanders for decisions
of the
hour.

The most thorough part of the plan concerned the

Prussian advancement up to and through the French frontiers.
Moltke considered it a mistake to make any war plans
detailed on isolated points and then lay them away for any
length of time.

He believed that the first meeting of the

two armies would change any preconceived plans, and there-

fore all action had to be based on the problems of the
times.

As the situations developed he believed that some

things previously planned would become impracticable, while
others, though previously impossible^ might become possible.

As a result, Moltke thought that the^best he could do was
to weigh the facts and decide what was best for an unknown
30

period.

Franco-German War of 1870-1871 .
New York: Harper Brothers Company, 1892, pp. 6-8,
hereafter cited as Moltke, Franco-German War.

30. Helmuth von Moltke,

20.

MATERIAL AND TECHi\OLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS
The French entered the war in 1870 with a
railway system

which had been established between 1851 and
1855,

The only

dealings that the military had had with the
railroad companies concerned financial matters. No plans had
been made
for a system which would transport large
numbers of troops

and supplies during war.

In 1869, General Niel appointed a commission
to consider possible reform of the rules that regulated
railway

transportation for the military.

The commission, made up

of both civilian and military personnel, designed
a plan
for the coordination of the military and railway
transport-

ation that was very similar to the German system of military
rail movement.

Primarily due to the death of Niel, the plan

was virtually forgotten.

Consequently, the French entered

the war in 1870 with a military transport system that had

been founded in 1855 and had already proven inadequate by
32

1859.

auTifig
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Italian var.

A great deal of the chaos which resulted in 1870 was
due to the antiquated rules which had never been changed

since they had first been initiated in 1851 and 1855,

For

example, one of the 1855 rules had stated that,"Of ficers

were responsible for the prescribed movements in connection

31, Edwin a, Pratt, The Rise of Rail- Power ,
Philadelphia:
Hereafter
J, B, Lippincott Company, 1916, p, 138,
cited as Pratt, Rail- Power,
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with the entraining, and should personally co-operate in
ensuring observance of the regulation referring thereto,"

33

but the fact was that many officers refused even to
con-

sider this regulation as an aspect of their duties and re-

garded it as the responsibility of the railroad officials.

Even the great Prussian victory at Sadowa in 1866 did
not stir the French to reform and in fact it had the wrong

effect on the French public in general; their sole concern

was to show Prussia that France was still supreme in Europe.
After the impressive Prussian military victory at Sadowa,
a few of the French military leaders began to realize that

Prussia was considerably more than the perfect paper
it

had been considered previously.

a few military leaders, however,

array

The alarm shown by

still failed to arouse

the majority of the French military authorities and the

public in general.

The French General Trochu, in his writ-

ings^showed that he had changed his opinion of the Prussian
army after Sadowa, but even his personal letters to the

Emperor failed to stir any reforms within the French army.
Both the French military attach^ in Berlin and General

Ducrot in Strasbourg, warned the French heads of government
of the huge number of reserves, the good equipment, and the

Napoleon I not only looked for new strategic developments, but one of the major facets of
his military genius was his quick movement of
troops to an opponent's weakness. Therefore, it
is quite improbable that during his early campaigns
Mapoleon could not have for^een the great possibilities of railroads during periods of war. If nothing else. Napoleon I certainly would have learned the
necessity of reform after the Italian lesson of 1859,

33. Ibid., p. 141,
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excellent military organization of the Prussian
army.

These

continual warnings fell upon deaf ears, and the
only response
from the general public, which was the only
element who

could hare forced action

to

balance these inequalities, was
34"

an attitude of indifference.

One of the few changes that did occur in the French
array

as a direct result of the Prussian victory in 1866
was

a greater emphasis on a new type of gun called
the "chassepot".

This weapon, in many cases, was even superior to the Prussian "needle gun" which was breech loading and had showed
its complete supremacy over the Austrian muzzle-loaders.

Both rifles allowed the soldiers to load them in any position and could have had an even greater effect on the tactics
of both the French and Prussian military leaders if these

groups had not been so hesitant to abandon the old methods.
In addition, despite the superiority of their weapon, the

French failed to take advantage of this fact by not teaching their troops how to effectively use these new arms.

These facts, combined with an exaggerated lack ot mobility,

greatly hurt the chances of a French military victory in
35

1870.

34. Arpad Ko vacs, "French Military Institutions Before the
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Because the Prussian breechloading artillery
pieces were
accepted as being far better than the French
muzzle loading
cannons, the French tried to counter-balance this
advantage

with the use of a new weapon called the "mitrailleuse".
This weapon, a forerunner of the modern machine
gun, had

thirty-seven barrels that fired simultaneously.

Due to the

French fear that the new weapon might fall into
Prussian

hands, only a small group of French officers were
actually

acquainted with its function and possible use.

The result

was that very few of these guns had been manufactured by
1870 and, as a result, they had little influence on military

strategy.

The few "mitrailleuses" which were in use during

the fighting of 1870 were usually used as field cannons

rather than as infantry weapons which, if they had been

used correctly by the French, could have brought direct fire
36

superiority to bear at close range.
The use of artillery to provide the best possible ad-

vantage had been a French tradition established during the

campaigns of the first Napoleon.

During the war of 1870,

however, the artillery seemed, as did some of the other arms
of the French military, to rest more upon its past history
and tradition than upon

i ts dcveUpioj p^eeUion.

Not only were

36. Richard Preston, Sydney F. Wise, and Herman 0. Werner,
Men in Arms . New York: Praeger, 1962, pp. 250Hereafter cited as Preston, Arms .
251.
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the guns themselves imperfect weapons,
but target practice

had been badly neglected.

These two facts, combined with

the third fact that the French lacked a
competent artillery

commander who could gain maximum effectiveness by
maneuvering for greater concentration of fire power, left
the French
at a distinct disadvantage within the area of artillery.

37

Not only could the Prussian field pieces fire farther,
but
they were also more numerous than the French cannons.

On the other hand^ the French artillery, had the good

qualities of quickly coming into position ana commencing to
fire very early.

These facts were negligible in 1870 because

the French artillery had broken from the Napoleonic tradition

of massing the guns behind the infantry in order to cripple

various enemy positions of infantry and gun emplacements.
Instead, the artillery spread its weapons hoping to hinder
the enemy from deducing the proper range for its own gun
38
emplacements.
This meant that the enemy could not find
the correct range of the French artillery, but it also

meant that French fire power could not be direct and con-

centrated when it was most needed.
In the final 2Lnalysis, the French military frequently
broke with the best traditions of Napoleon I, while they

37. Boguslawski, Tactical Deductions,

p.
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refused to discard many of his outdated ideas
when it was
vital that such concepts should have been
discarded.
At about the time the French dispersed their
fire power,

von Molke began to emphasize concentrated fire
after watch
ing the French in the Italian campaign in
1859.
On the

other hand, when the French should have broken
with the

Napoleonic tactic of moving into the attack by columns,
so as to take full advantage of the new "chassepot"
rifle,

they failed to do so.

26.

CHANGES IN FRENCH MILITARY DOCTRINE
BEFORE 1851
The French after 1814, in almost
complete reversal to
the Prussian acceptance of universal
conscription, returned
to the belief in a small professional
army. Much of this
was the result of the restoration of
the Bourbon monarchy
to the throne of France by the enemies
of Napoleon I,

Not

only did the monarchy have a distaste for
Napoleonic military
tradition, but it also had no use for a large
standing army
which might arouse the hostility of the
various nations
which were providing the French monarchy with
the support
necessary for it to remain in power, in any
case it was
felt that a professional army could be relied
upon for future

support much more dependably than could a large

peasant base.

array

with a

This belief, which evolved from the conditions

of 1814, was to continue as the dominant French
military

thought until 1870.

The period from 1814, when the Bourbons

abolished universal conscription, until the revolution of
1848, saw little desire for a large standing array.

Only

after 1848 was there any extensive feeling which realized
the necessity for a conscripted array based upon the common

man.

This view was suppressed by Napoleon III who, during

the early part of his reign, relied completely on a well-

trained professional army.

In the end, the "levee en masse"

that was born during the French Revolution of 1792

was quickly repudiated in the country of its birth in 1814.

27.

This is not to say that Napoleon

universal conscription.

I

knowingly supported

In 1802, Napoleon continued the

policy of the Directory in allowing exceptions as long
as
the individual could find someone to take his place.

In

fact, he initiated another system of evasion by which
all

individuals would draw lots, and the one who drew an unlucky
lot number would have to serve on active duty.

Even this

system was found to be unnecessary and was eliminated when

Napoleon ended the "levee en masse" in 1805,

39

Napoleon was

aware of the many advantages of a professional army but he

also fully realized the great need for superior numbers in

many victories.

It was because of this second factor that

he found it necessary to gradually rely upon a large nation-

al array, rather than upon a small professional elite army.

Yet, Napoleon

I

had set out in 1805 to develop an elite

army which would follow him blindly.

He replaced the

citizen soldiers, with their patriotic nationalism, with
the professional troopers who were well paid and well dis-

ciplined.
I

In this instance, it could be argued that Napoleon

established the foundation for France's national dependence

on a professional army.

In the end, he could be considered

the father of both seemingly contradictory movements.

On

one hand, he believed firmly in mass armies, because of his

great faith in the advantage of superior numbers, while,
on the other hand, he had a strong intellectual belief in

39. Kovacs, French Military Institutions ,

p. 219.
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an elite professional army.

In any case, I^lapoleon saw the

necessity for the re-establishment of universal conscription
after his devastating defeat in Russia in 1812,

As a result,

he extended this theory of a nation in arms from 1812 to

1815,

During this entire three year period there develop-

ed a great hatred on the part of the French population for

military conscription.

When the Bourbons abolished conscrip-

tion in 1814, its demise was popularly acclaimed.

After 1830, the increased fear of foreign invasion
forced the development of a system that doubled the 40,000

annual recruits which France was allowed by the law of 1818,
The law of 1832 divided the army into two groups: profes-

sional soldiers who served seven years, and another group

which did not serve any active duty at all but were to be

used as reserves for the regular
emergency.

array

in case of a national

The law also provided a ruling that forced any-

one who had purchased his freedom with a replacement to do
so again if his replacement deserted.

The morale of the

French army reached an all time low during the years follow40

ing the defeat of Napoleon I,

After 1814, the majority of the French leaders failed
to inspire the French military to any feats out of the

The most positive period of the French military

ordinary.

40, Ibid ,

,

pp. 220-221.
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between 1815-1851 occurred during
the reign of Louis Philippe. During this interval the French
armies were disciplined
and had several effective leaders.
Later, when
some of the

French leaders tried to revive the early
Napoleonic traditions,
they found that the troops had lost
one of the basic ingredients of a good army, namely discipline.
As an indirect
result, the military became a tool of the
dominant French

party in power.

The early period of the Second Empire
was

centered on the glittering aspects of war, while
most of the
necessary reforms were swept under the carpet.

The military

of the Second Empire in no way changed its
system to correct
the anachronisms, and^ the army which seemingly
originated

as a national body, was, in the final analysis,
based on a
41
small professional army.

Before the French Revolution, the French military leaders had used the institution of the general staff, but it

was abolished in 1790.

Under Napoleon

I

a general staff

was organized, but because of his own personality and military
brilliance. Napoleon did not use his staff extensively in any
42

area other than matters of supply.

After the Napoleonic era, the need for an effective

general staff became increasingly evident in order to make

41, Boguslawski, Tactical Deductions ,

42. Irvine, Capital Staffs ,

p. 168.

pp. 23-24.
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more effective use of the greater artillery
power in the

fluid battle conditions which later developed.

Although

Bonaparte had shown the need to make thorough
preparations
for campaigns, it was the general staff of later
years which

inherited this job, as well as that of creating an organ-

ization to handle the increasingly massive armies.
Prussian military leaders rapidly realized the advantages of the general staff, and made maximum use of the
organization.

One of the greatest failures of the French

military heads in 1870, on the other hand, was their inability
to realize the full potential of a strong general staff.
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Napoleon III was probably the only individual in France
who could have brought about the needed reforms.

Who was

this man. Napoleon I, in whose footsteps Napoleon III had to

follow?

Napoleon

I

had as complete faith in his own military

ability, as Napoleon III had in his own ability to defeat

Bismarck diplomatically.

:.,

:

Napoleon and his namesake

were similar in the respect that neither could accept the

appearance of another popular figure upon the French scene.
The first Emperor would not let any military victories be

denied him, even if they belonged to a subordinate commander.
In contrast. Napoleon III, as he grew older, let the reigns

of power slip from his grasp.

During his later years. Napoleon

III was seldom as vital a person as his uncle had been and

43, Freston, Arms,

p,

248.
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probably would never have been moved to some
of the rash
actions of Napoleon I. The first Napoleon was
a classic

militarist who used any position which would give
him the
military advantage, as opposed to Napoleon III*s
lack of

general concepts and continual hesitancy to use
force when
the possibility of defeat occurred.

Napoleon

I

discarded

all rules when considering war and must be
considered a

pragmatist to the core.

Even though the Napoleonic blitz-

krieg tactics are well known, it is wrong to assume that
the inventor was foolish about these sudden thrusts.

This

can be seen in the comments of an English officer who had

fought Napoleon

I

in Spain.

"Row absurdly Napoleon has been

called a rash warrior, and one never thinking of retreat.
No man ever made bolder marches, but no man ever secured

his base with more care.

Here, he would not suffer any

advance to fresh conquests until his line of communication
44
had been strengthened."
In reality, his unorthodox method
of brutal swiftness was combined with extreme care for
45

technical detadls and deep consideration of tactics.

Napoleon I, in all probability, would never have allowed
France's last chance of potential victory, an immediate
drive into the southern Germanic states, slip away because
of previous lack of planning and miscalculation, as Napoleon
III did in 1870.

44. W.

F.

Napier, War In The Peninsula . Philadelphia: Carey
and Hart Company, 1842, Vol. II, p. 217.
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CHAMGES DURING THE

SECOl^iD

EMPIRE

It is incorrect to assume that Napoleon Ill's seizure
of power in 1850 was viewed with disapproval by any sizable

element in French society.

On many occasions during the

first years of the Second Empire the people overwhelmingly

voted for Napoleon III in either legislative elections or in
plebiscites.

The last plebiscite of the early 1850 's found

7,800,000 voters approving of Napoleon's coup d'etat while
only 600,000 disapproved.

However, this approval slowly

slid to the opposite extreme, particularly between 1863 and
1870,

Although Napoleon's policies became more liberal, his

opposition increased in strength as he loosened control.

The

more the government eased the laws of the press and public

meetings, the more the comraor man rebelled under the restrictions which remained.

Finally, in 1870, a special commission

reported that the workers believed their conditions could
46

only be improved by the fall of the Second Empire.

Louis

Napoleon thus faced this dilemma during the latter years of
his reign.

It is to his credit that he continued his liberal

ization policy in face of this growing opposition.

When Napoleon III came to power he not only inherited
the popular acclaim that had been his uncle's, but he also

inherited the diplomatic problems which the fitst Napoleon
had, to a large extent, created.

In 1815 the allies tried

46, David I. Kulsten,"The Attitude of French Workers Towards
The Second Empire," French Historical Studies . Vol.
II, No. 3, Spring, 1962, pp, 359, 3Y3, and JVl.
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to guarantee the Germanic lands from ever
again being in-

vaded by the French,

The victors not only restored the

old 18th century Franco-German border, but they
also extended Prussian influence in these frontier areas
while establishing a loose Germanic Confederation, with the
hope that

Germanic resistance would be strong enough to
resist any
future French invasion. This was a harsh blow to
French

pride and influence.

Thus, the peace of 1815 that grew out

of the Napoleonic struggle was to set the French
pattern of

foreign policy for years to come.

The view, held primarily

by the British, that order in the western Germanic
states

would promote the peace of Europe, in actuality continually
chafed the French, and was viewed by them as a continuing
symbol of defeat.

The friction concerning this border area

continued to exist even during Napoleon III«s administration,
and with even greater severity after 1870.

Therefore, when

Napoleon III inherited the Napoleonic Legend he was also
forced to accept the responsibility of resuming the Napoleonic

policies with regard to the Rhineland, and regaining, by force
if necessary, the open door policy to western Germany,

Napoleon

III sought to answer this problem by means of his policies
47
throughout the 1860 »s.
Because France could never accept the

47. Hermann Oncken, Napoleon III and the Rhine , New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1928, pp. 8-11. Hereafter cited
as Oncken, Napoleon III .
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oeace of 1815 as a defensive measure,
it watched vigilantly
for the opportunity to regain
its old position in the Rhineland. In 1866, Napoleon III
believed that Austria would
certainly defeat Prussia, or at least
Prussia would have to
withdraw many of its troops from the
Rhine area. With the
shock of Sadowa he was forced to
bide his time. He weakly
tried to get Bismarck to agree to
some concession in the
southwestern Germanic states in return
for France »s neutrality in 1866, Bismarck, of course,
did not yield any con-

cessions to France and, in fact, allowed
some of the southern Germanic states to see Napoleon»s
letter, thus driving

them into closer relations with Prussia.

In this particular

instance it can be seen that Napoleon III
lacked any of the
military genius of his uncle and, in the end,
blundered in
the area he considered his personal forte,
diplomacy.

Bismarck did not underestimate Napoleon IIl»s
diplomatic
skills as some liiitorianx have done in the past.
He con-

sidered Louis Napoleon a worthy opponent who upon
occasion

was given to weakness.

The Chancellor admitted only once to

being completely fooled by Napoleon^ and that incident
occurred in 1866 after the battle of Sadowa, when Napoleon in-

dicated that if the Prussians entered the city of Vienna it

would automatically mean

a

declaration of war by France,

Bismarck stated,"! have never forgiven him for that, but,
48
at any rate, he has been cruelly punished in his turn,"

The hatred that this incident stirred up in Bismarck seems

48. Henry Hayward, Bismarck In Pri vate Life.
New York: Appleton Co., 1890, p. 82. "HereaTter cited as Hayward, Bismarck.
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to shed more light on why, in
1870, he did not hesitate to
distort the Ems dispatch to his own
advantage.

Many historians have, until recently,
taken a hostile
position with regard to Napoleon in because

they have judged

him primarily on the last major action
of his reign, the
Franco-Prussian War. This tendency on the part

of many authors

gives a distorted view of Napoleon III.

His sometimes ad-

venturous, and eventually disastrous, foreign
policy should
be viewed in relationship to the various
pressures brought
to bear by the French public, and by the
many political

factions and court intrigues which continuously
demanded

military and diplomatic victories abroad, while
none of
these elements within the French society desired
to make
any sacrifices themselves.
It would seem that the foreign policy of Louis
Napoleon

during the later stages of his reign was often carried
out in
spite of public pressure.

Finally, at the last of his crises,

Louis conceded to public opinion, and disaster resulted.

If

these pressures were as great as some individuals believe,
then it becomes evident that a great portion of Napoleon III»s
49

foreign policy was molded by his domestic needs.
Frequently, and not always with Napoleon's strong support,

various groups within the Second Empire demanded war as a

49. Alan B. Spitzer,"The Good Napoleon III," French Historical Studies .
Vol. II, No. 3, Spring, 1962, pp.
309, 313, 326, and 329.
Hereafter cited as Spitzer,
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means of furthering France's foreign policy aims.

Three minor

wars, along with several isolated skirmishes, in various parts
of the world, were to form the foundation of the French

military attitude of self-confidence which was so prevalent
in 1870.

Thus, the Second Empire's military tradition was

founded on a very weak basis as compared to that of the First

Empire in 1810, which had frequently beaten its enemies in
total struggles for survival, as compared to the inconsequential wars fought by the Second Empire up to 1870,

The first of these minor wars was the Crimean War which

broke out in 1854.

Even though the large expedition of

French troops was not overly successful militarily. Napoleon
III succeeded diplomatically by his achievement of an alliance

with Great Britilji,

At the start, the French tried to use

diplomacy rather than military force in handling the Crimean
situation.

Because this diplomacy failed and Britain demand-

ed military action. Napoleon III could not readily refuse
the use of military force and as a result he was forced to

use an implement which he felt unnecessary.

During the first stages of the war, in 1854, the allied
armies of 50,000 met little opposition from the 35,000

Russian troops.

As the war bogged down, however, the allied

victories became fewer.

Because neither diplomatic nor military

victory occurred quickly enough, on February 16th, Napoleon III

announced that he would be forced to take supreme command of
the allied forces in person.

37.

As might be expected from past French military
history,
the military operations of the Crimean war
showed
the true

valor of the individual French soldier, but it
also inaicated
a completely inadequate military organization.

Not only was

general strategy lacking, but many military leaders
formed
views from these few isolated battles that would
prevail
in 1870 and lead them to make severe errors in
judgement.

Many of these military leaders were to make future
decisions,
based on these and similar cases, in the years to come.

For

example, the 30,000 French soldiers in the battle of Alma
sijj^ri

singly found the cliffs they were

to

attack undefended.

After some difficulty they successfully climbed the cliffs
and arrived just in time to save the day for the English,

who were under heavy fire, by viciously attacking the Russian
flank.

The haphazard manner in which this victory was achiev

ed for the allies indicated a complete absence of general

leadership and strategy

that would rarely have been found
So
under Napoleon I, during the early stage of his career.

Again in the battle of Inkermann the French regiments
arrived not a moment

too

soon to prevent the Russians from

completely crushing the English,

In fact, many English

historians call this battle "the soldiers battle" since the
lowly enlisted man made up for the lack of military strategy

on the part of the officers.

Even the most decisive battle

50, Harold Murdock, The Reconstruction of Europe , Boston:
Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1890, pp, 56-57, Here
after cited as Murdock, Reconstruction,
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of all, Sebastopol, was started by
a bursting bomb which was
mistaken for a signal flare and an entire
assault of three

French divisions was launched before the
necessary preparations had been made. This, of course,
resulted in horrible
slaughter and great mass confusion. The
fact remained that
the bravery of the French soldier time
and again made up for
the knowledge his leaders lacked.
At one point, the allied

troops were told to attack Russian gun
positions on the causeway heights. Because of the great distance
and the exposed

characteristics of the assaulting force few, if any, of
the
attacking force reached the Russian artillery
positions.

When they were met with reserve Russian cavalry wholesale
retreat resulted.

The entire retreating body might have been

destroyed if it had not been for a brilliant and valorous
charge by the French 4th Chasseurs d«Afrique against the

Russian positions.

This charge unnerved the Russian artillery

long enough so that a retreat could take place.

51

There was

never a question of the French soldier *s courage during the

Crimean fighting.
It must be reasoned that the Crimean war was, to a great

extent, the origin of much of Napoleon Ill's later success
in the field of foreign policy.

Napoleon III had achieved the

goals that he sought when he had entered this war: *^ strength
52

ening his hold on the throne and the Napoleonic legend.

^1- IMji.
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had successfully made an alliance with England
and had forced
the entire world to recognize the
supremacy of France
on the

European continent,
Next came the Italian war in 1859 which hurt
Napoleon»s

prestige at home, as well as abroad.

The Catholic clergy

in France, who had previously supported
Napoleon, turned

against him when it was realized that France »s
support of

Italian unity would threaten the Vatican states.

Napoleon

III was thus incapable of getting the continuous
Catholic

support that his uncle had received from the Concordat of
1801.

With its ally Sardinia, France was victorious in key

battles against the Austrians at Solferino and Magenta,

When Napoleon III saw the opposition to Italian unity that
existed in France he quickly withdrew and signed a separate
peace at Villafranca.

One of the other facts that speeded

French withdrawal from the war was the fact that Prussia had

decided to send troops into the Rhineland,

Napoleon III had

only 77,000 reserves in 1859 to counteract the Prussian move,
and at least 100,000 troops were necessary to balance the

situation.

To his great embarrassment he found that he could

not even raise the additional 20,000 reserves and therefore

was forced to sign a peace with Austria quickly.

In the end,

the war that had enhemced French prestige after its great

victory at Solferino ended in great embarrassment for France

throughout Europe,

As a direct result of this incident

40.

Napoleon III ordered the second section of
the inactive
reserves to be given five months active training. 53

This

training never took place for various reasons:
lack of
facilities, trained instructors and lack of the
necessary

military equipment.
The bravery of the French soldier was still
in evidence

during the Italian campaign.

This had been shown best in

hand to hand fighting with the bayonet which so amazed
the

Austrians that the use of the bayonet became an important
technique taught by the Austrian army after 1859.

The

critical eye of von Moltke did not make the Austrian mistake
for he fully realized the power lay^ not merely in the use
of the bayonet, but in the French soldiers' courage.

For

this reason, the Prussian military training started to em-

phasize the accuracy of rifle fire power at a distance,
rather than the usual practice of firing one wild shot and

then quickly moving into close combat.

In this way the

Prussians hoped to cause a great many enemy casualties before any hand to hand fighting could occur in actual combat.

Even though the possibility of a war with Austria had
been foreseen in France three years previously no great
effort was made along the lines of planning for it.

The

same confusion that took place in 1854 occurred again in

53. Kovacs, French Military Institu t ions , p. 222.
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1859,

When the first French troops arrived in Italy they

lacked almost every type of equipment, which then had to be

borrowed from the Italians.

The lack of planning was evident

when Napoleon III stated, "We have sent an army of 120,000
men into Italy before having stocked up any supplies there.

This is the opposite of what we should have done."

54

This

extremely poor military administration had existed in the
French army even during the era of Napoleon

I

but his own

military brilliance and his ability to regroup usually made
up for this lack of organization.

It became evident in both

1854 and 1859, however, that there was no French general

who was brilliant enough to achieve what had been done from
1800-1814,

Even though the French supplies and organization

had been poor during these two wars, French victory occurred

because their opponents' supplies and organizations were

even worse than their own.

This, however, was not the case

in 1870,
France's third minor war during the Second Empire took

place in Mexico between 1862 and 1867,

One of the most

important aspects of this conflict was that it greatly re-

duced the number of French troops in Europe,

Consequently,

France could not aid Austria in its war against Prussia in

54, Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussia n War , London: Rupert
Hart-Davis, 1962, p, 17, Hereafter cited as
Howard, The Franco-Prussian War ,
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1866 with anything other than moral support.

Napoleon III

failed even v/ith war to extend French influence in the

Western Hemisphere,

In this respect he failed as his uncle

had failed before him, but he realized the weakness of
committing a major portion of his best troops much less
quickly than had his uncle.

mistake earlier. Napoleon

I

In addition to realizing his

had never committed crack troops

to any great extent in a Western Hemispheric adventure.

During the early 1860 »s, Juarez, the rebel leader, led continual guerrilla warfare against the French government which

was headed by Napoleon III»s puppet, Maximilian,

There are

two important reasons for looking at the Mexican fighting

from a military standpoint.

The first is that the type of

fighting which took place, guerrilla warfare, was

to

combine

with the French military experiences gained from the isolated
battles of the Crimean and Italian campaigns to
military tactics they later used in 1870.

fojpf

the

In all instances

methods and tactics mattered far less than the valor and
capacity of the French soldiers.

Had not the French army

successfully protected its military reputation in all cases?
In the wars against Russia

anci

Austria the French organization

was extremely poor while fighting and defeating comparatively
modern enemy armies,

France's difficulties in the Mexican
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episode Should surely have stirred
some afterthoughts in the
minds of the military leaders
of France. These questions
bring us to our second reason
for looking at the Mexican
war.
Again the French were victorious,
but the fact remained that some of their best
troops had an extremely
difficult
time in defeating, not the
fairly modern Russian or Austrian
armies, but a motley group of
Mexican peasants who were
untrained, ill-armed, and completely
lacking in equipment.
Fighting against these soldier-farmers
were
some of the

best troops that France^lt her
disposal.

The following is

an account of what sometimes
happened when these two forces

faced each other.

"The

'beau fait d'armes' of the 99th

infantry regiment of the line consisted
of a disastrous
assault against Guadaloupe Hill (May
5,

first attack on Puebla.

1862) during the

This engagement took a heavy toll

of lives and the outcome forced the
French to retreat to

Orizaba where they awaited reenf orceraents."*'^
When the United
States ended its Civil War and demanded
that France remove

her troops from Mexico, Napoleon

m

not only suffered

humiliation at the hands of the United States, but
because
of the speed of the Prussian victory he had been
unable

to deter the growth of Prussian power on the
continent

with its growing military power.

.

Pierre de la Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire .
Plon, 1899-1905, Vol. IV, pp. 70-75.

Paris
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Although there had been many French military victories,
a few people in France did start to realize the
shallowness

of these victories.

There grew a restlessness within the

French public who criticized Napoleon III»s policies and

weakened his basis for popular support.
view that Louis Napoleon started

to

If one accepts the

lose the popular support

of many Catholics in 1859, and various other groups later,
it becomes apparent that he instigated his policy of greater

liberalization in the 1860 »s in the hope of winning back
some of this popular support.

It is questionable if the

plebiscite of May 8, 1870 indicated the popular support of

Napoleon III, or whether it instead endorsed his policy of
56

liberalization.

Previous to the outbreak of the war in 1870, Paris

seemed prosperous and content* to many outward appearances.
This facade of splendor misled many people, so that they

could not see the restlessness and popular discontent that
lay beneath the surface.

This discontent, combined with the

physical disabilities of the emperor, weakened France a
great deal.

Napoleon III viewed this popular discontent with regret.
He felt that the French people were not only unfit for the

more liberal reforms he wanted to give them but that they

56. Schevill, Europe

,

p.

548,

In comparison, it is difficult for cinyone to picture
Napoleon I being pressured into initiating any liberal policies if they did not serve his own ends.
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also held him responsible for things that he considered

ridiculously petty and which were no concern of his.

In

general, he thought that the French people looked too much
57

to the government to solve many of their problems,

A great deal can be said in defense of Napoleon III»s
reign on the basis of his liberalizing reforms that he brought
about on the domestic scene in hopes of raising the average

Frenchmen's standard of living,

Ke fervently believed that

the common man had the right to his "just share of the
58

national wealth,"

57, Elihu B, Washburne, Recollections of a Minister to France ,
London: St, Dunstan, Vol, I, 1887, pp, 6 and 16,
Hereafter cited as Washburne, Recollections ,
Elihu B, Washburne, the American Minister to
France, who had been a lawyer in Illinois, and a
Republican Congressman from 1853 to 1869, Dt-ring
his Congressional period he had been the chairmein
of the Committee of Commerce besides heading the
Impeachment Committee of 1868, Although President
Grant appointed him Secretary of State, because
of certain physical disabilities he resigned the
post only a few days after being appointed. Shortly after he was appointed to the post of American
ambassador to France, which position he held from
1869 to 1877. During this period he viewed the
Paris siege of 1870-1871 and the following days
FraJiklin Jameson, Diction of the Paris Commune.
ary of United States His tory.
Boston: Puritan,
18^7, pp. 693-694,
58, Spitzer, Napoleon III . p> 316,
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Napoleon III at first saw no need for large
numbers of
people to serve in the army, particularly since

such a view

would not have been well received by the
populace of France.
Consequently, when he came to power in 1852, rather
than

reforming the lottery system, he further corrupted
the

establishment by allowing each conscript to make a
direct
payment of between 2,000 and 2,500 francs to the
government

instead of hiring

59
a

substitute.

This not only lessened the

number of conscripts but also caused a deep feeling
of

hostility among the lower classes.

Thus, Napoleon III, as

had his uncle before him, acted against universal conscription,

only in the fleeting years of his reign did he see

the error of his earlier policy.

As a result of his policy the number of annual con-

scripts decreased to about 20,000.

This group was made up

of the poorer classes who could not raise the required money
to save their sons from the disaster of having to spend

seven years in the army.

Not only did Napoleon III»s policy

cause certain social stigma, but it added to his complete

dependency upon a mercenary force of about 260,000 volunteers,
who either reenlisted or were long service professional
soldiers.

His complete reliance upon this elite profession-

al/^dwindled his reserve to an insignificant number since

only 20,000 men were being released from active duty each

59. Richard D. Challener, The French Theory of the^jation
New York: Columbia University Press, 1955,
Tn Arms .
Hereafter cited as Challener, Nation in Arms .
p. 13.
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year.

Kis heavy spending for his exclusive Praetorian
guard

did not even allow enough financial support for
the training
^
60
of the second part of the army
as allowed for in the law
of 1832.
a

This law stipulated that each year there would be

certain number of men who would be drafted into the
reserve

and never have to serve any time on active duty
except for a
few weeks of training each year.

Because of the lack of

finances this group of reservists never received any training whatsoever.

This carelessness proved to be

a

decisive

factor in 1859.
The fact is that the military leaders of France during
the 1860 's lacked any real faith in the drafted soldier.

This, combined with the unwillingness of most Frenchmen to
serve seven years in the army, formed a strong force that

many individuals stronger than Napoleon III would have fail-

ed

to

change.

Even Napoleon I, after his return from Moscow

in 1812, had riots, mutinies and whole-scale desfertion on

his hands when he re-established conscription.

The army

leaders of the 1860 's considered only the "old soldier" as

having the qualities they thought necessary for a good army.
The long service soldier had what was referred to as the true
61

military spirit, "1« esprit railitaire".

60. Kovacs, French Military Institutions ,
61, Challener, Nation in Arms ,

p.

15.

This belief that

p. 223.
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the individual abilities
of a soldier were much
more im-

portant than the total number of
men was most strongly
supported by Colonel Ardant du Picq.
As the foremost
spokesman of this view during the 1860
's, du Picq spoke
a great deal from experience
that he had acquired in the
Crimean War and the actions in Africa
and Syria/^ What he
failed to realize was that these
compaigns had been limited
conflicts, frequently against untrained
natives or illequipped troops. In all of these
engagements there was
nothing that could have been considered
a complete and fullscale war between two evenly equipped
and trained modern
armies. Therefore, the experiences of
du Picq and many of the
other leading French military minds did
not prepare them for
the type of warfare that they would
be confronted with in

1870.

Du Picq even questioned Napoleon I»s view
that the
number of troops under a commander's control was a
decisive
factor in the outcome of a battle.

To point this out he wrote

"Let us take Wagram, where his (Napoleon I) mass
was not repulsed. Out of 22,000 men, from 3,00C to
1,500 reached the position. Certainly the position
was not carried by them, but by the material and moral
effect of a battery of one hundred pieces, cavalry,
etc., etc. Were the 19,000 missing men disabled? No.
Seven out of twenty-two, a third, an enormous proportion,
may have been hit. What became of the 12,000 unaccounted for? They had lain down on the road, had played
dummy in order not to go on to the end."^-^

62, Earle, Strategy ,
63. Ibid,, p. 208.

p. 207,
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Du Picq supported this theory by
pointing out that
defeat did not result from the initial
shock of two armies
meeting, or the physical destruction
that occurred, but only

when the moral fiber of one army began
to disintegrate.
he believed,

Thus,

the greatest loss of life in battle
took place

when one of the armies lost its morale
and plunged into headlong retreat. He supported his view when,
after
studying

various periods of military history, he
concluded that the
answer to military victory was not military
heroism but the

suppression of fear.

His theory was that since all men are

afraid during combat, it was only the well
disciplined troops
who suppressed this fear in the decisive moments
when battles
were won or lost.

Du Picq's acceptance of technological and

tactical changes as being secondary to the morale of
troops

showed a vast difference from the Prussian emphasis on
these

military areas.

He considered them of only secondary import-

ance since both of these elements underwent continual change.

For this reason du Picq thought the only stable basis of a

good army must have been the morale and discipline of the
64

individual soldier.
with Napoleon

I

In essence, du Picq seemed to agree

that certain technological and tactical

changes had to occur, yet he always believed that good military
discipline might carry the day in any case since it was not
susceptible to change as tactics were.

64. Ibid .

,

pp. 210-212

Although du Picq

50,

agreed on the surface with Napoleon on this
point of change,
in reality he saw little need for it and thus
supported the
same military tactics and system that the French
had used
so blunderingly, yet luckily, in Italy, Africa,
and Mexico.

Because of these beliefs, du Pica and the majority of
the leading military minds of France felt the
need for a

well disciplined and well trained soldier who not only
developed his professional ability but also established a
personal unity which was combined with the feeling of elite
pride and love of glory.

This view of esprit de corps

continues to dominate many military minds, even down to the
present day.
The advantages of a professional army, compared to the

large conscripted armies with all their mob tendencies,

seemed obvious in 1860,

As a result, du Picq led the break with Napoleon I's

emphasis on numerical supremacy since he believed that warfare in the 1860

*s

had changed a great deal since the early

Du Picq stated, "In these days of perfected long-

1800 »s.

range arms of destruction a small force,... by a happy com-

bination of good sense or genius with morale or appliances
may,,,, secure heroic victories over a great force similarly
65

armed,"

This view combined with the fact that these leaders

lacked any faith in the ability of the reserves to fight also

hindered the development of an adequate reserve program that
might have supported the professional army when necessary.

65, Ibid,, p. 215
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The obvious break between the French
military strategist
of 1870 and the principles of Napoleon

I

can best be sum-

marized by a few quotations from Colonel du
Picq who stated:
"Just as formerly it was impossible to execute
fire
at command
so it is today.
Formerly no sight-setting
was possible; it is no better today....

^

Man in the mass, in a disciplined body
organized for
combat; IS invincible before an undisciplined
body.
But against a similarly disciplined body
he reverts to
the primitive man who flees before a
force proved stronger, or that he feels stronger.
The heart of the soldier
IS always the human heart.
Discioline holds enemies
face to face a little longer, but' the
instinct of
preservation maintains its empire and with it the selfsense
of fear.
Fear..,.

Man in battle,.,., is a being to whom the instinct
ot selt-preservation at times dominates
everything
else.
Discipline, whose purpose is to dominate this
instinct by a feeling of greater terror, can not
wholly
achieve it. Discipline goes so far and no farther. "66
One must realize that du Picq held many sound military

views, but with the help of historical hindsight his
fail-

ures when compared to the principles of von Moltke and von

Roon become evident.

Thus, it is important that we view

French military thought in the 1860 's within its own historical period.

66. Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battles .
Mew York: Macmillan Company, 1921, pp. 259, 255,
and 257.
Hereafter cited as Du Picq, Battle Studies.
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This problem of conscription and a reserve program

remained a major problem of the French government ftom^
the late 1850 's right through to 1870.

As we have seen the

lack of reserves in 1859 forced the French to withdraw from
the Italian campaign.

Napoleon III subsequently tried to

reform the inactive reserve, but this attempt at reform
in 1861 must be considered a failure since the lack of re-

serves in 1866 again caused the French government great

embarrassment.

It was during this period between 1866 and

1870 that France lost her last opportunity to develop an

adequate mass

array

that might have successfully opposed the

Prussian masses.

Napoleon III and Ollivier, his prime minister, both
realized the importance of numbers in a possible future war.
At the Saint Cloud conferences in 1866, Napoleon spoke of a

universal military system which might provide France with
its needed reserve.

Although he realized the importance of

numerical superiority in a future war he found it necessary
67

Napoleon III*s

to ask, "How are we going to get them?"

reluctance to impose universal conscription must be noted as
another of the indications that his administration had been
far weaker than his uncle's.

Napoleon

I

had not been at all

hesitant to enforce even extreme conscription after his

disastrous defeat in Russia in 1812.

67. Challener, Nation in Arms ,

p. 17.
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At times in 1866 Napoleon III sounded as he had
several

years earlier when he had attempted to build himself
into
the image of the military genius similar to
the status of

his uncle by praising the Prussian conscription
system.

With

the help of General Niel, the new Minister of War,
Napoleon

proposed a new conscription program.

All able-bodied French-

men, about 160,000 men, were to be drafted and diyided
into
two classes each year.

The long seven year duty would con-

tinue but those fortunate to be in the first class could

choose to end their active duty at the end of three years.
By this program Napoleon III showed that he supported un-

iversal conscription, but in practical application he con-

tinued its inequalities.

In the end, he showed that he knew

the weakness of the French military system, yet pressures by
the military leaders and French society led to his failure
68
to bring about the needed reform,
Niel was even more moder-

ate than Napoleon since he knew the strong views of the

various leading military minds who opposed the reform bill.

Their program did allow for the paying of a substitute, but
in any case when the individual hired a replacement to take

his place on active duty he himself still had to serve a

period of time in the reserve,

Niel believed that this

program would continue the existing long term service but
support it with a much larger reserve base.

68, Kovacs, French Military Institution s,

However, Napoleon

p, 225.
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and Niel soon found their program a little extreme
for both
the military and the general public to accept.

69

In general, the French military leaders strongly dis-

liked Niel's program.

Du Picq, as would be expected, wrote

a book that was, in essence,

on military reserves.

a

rebuttal of Niel«s emphasis

In the book, du Picq weighed the ad-

vantages and disadvantages of both a mass army of conscripts
and a small elite

array

of professional soldiers.

Of course,

his conclusion was in favor of the small professional army;
'
a choice which later history proved quite inaccurate.

70

Various groups united with the military leaders to bring
severe pressure to bear on the deputies in the French legislature.

Since Napoleon III did not have absolute control over

the chamber he was never able to get them to accept his pro-

gram completely.

The typical view of the deputies can be

summed up in the comment that one of their members made at
the time,

"Of course we shall be obligated to pass this

bill, but we shall fix it up in such a way that it will never
71

work."

Even though most Frenchmen in 1866 gloried in the

69. Challener, Nation in Arm s, pp, 19-20,

70, Earle, Strategy , p, 20S.

This opposition would never have occurred in
the First Empire since Napoleon I would never
have allowed any question of his military decisions. Du Picq*s view was much more to the liking
of various elements within French society because
it offered the least amount of change. It, of
course, offered most groups the easy way out and
as a result won quick popular approval,
7Xo Challener, Nation in Arms , p. 21.
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victories of Napoleon I, few if any had a desire for the
renewal of his campaigns.

The Prussian victory at Sadowa

developed two contradictory feelings: that of hatred for
Prussia, and the desire for war; the second was that of

hatred of soldiering and the fight to remain free from it.
The draft program not only met resistance from the wealthy

who could no longer escape by payment, but surprisingly,
from the peasants who had enjoyed at least a gambling chance

previously of evading the draft altogether.

The government

did its best to lessen the opposition to the reform and the
bill finally passed the chamber as expected.

The impurities

of the law had decreased its opposition by various groups,

but the real test, that of application, enabled Napoleon

III*s opponents the chance to agitate violent riots against
72

his administration.

In the final analysis, the only good

change which occurred as a result of the law was the ending
of the policy of exoneration which had been instituted under

Napoleon I,

The bill itself did not bring about any change

in practice, and the result was that two years later the

French army that opposed the Prussians was in all aspects the
same one that Napoleon III had considered quite inadequate
73

earlier.
The only real result of the reform bill was that it

caused a great deal of restlessness with the reign of Napoleon

72. Gordon Wright, "Public Opinion and Conscription in France
1866-1870," Journal of Modern History . No. XIV,
March 1942, pp. 27-42, Hereafter cited as Wright,
Conscription in France .
73. Challener, Nation in Arms , p, 27,

,
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Its military value was nonexistent and it only
served

to weaken the Emperor's already declining hold
on

74

^

oower

in France,

Another factor which weakened the reform movement was
the death of Marshal

Mel.

The inadequate number of military

instructors to teach the National Guard units that existed
on paper, and the unwillingness of the French people to bear
the burden of part time military service made the French

National Guard a meaningless reserve for the small profession75

al army

Mot only were the French lacking in any concept of how
huge the numbers of combatants in a war with Prussia might
be, but they also lacked any detailed plan for war with

Prussia,

Any French ideas on this subject were usually

confined to thoughts of quick and sudden victories for France.
The French plan, as far as one existed, counted heavily on
the tradition of friction between the southern German states

and Prussia, and the swiftness of French action to counter-

balance the numerical superiority of the Prussian troops.
This French plan was based on a loose agreement with Italy
and Austria whereby the French armies of about 150,000 men

were to cross the Rhine River at Germersheim and march into
Bavaria,

This action was planned not only to separate the

northern and southern Germanic states but

to provide the

74, Wright, Conscription in France , p. 45.

75, Boguslawski, Tactical Deductions , p, 29,

57.

necessary time needed for the Italian and Austrian armies to
76

join the French forces already in Bavaria,

Once the three

armies were united under the command of a general previously

decided upon by the three countries, their total force
number 300,000 men.

would

About 35,000 Italians were to be sent to

occupy Munich while the rest of the armies were to start
toward FranlCfurt so as to establish a base for the future
77

campaign to occupy the rest of Germany.

The plan also

provided that the strong French navy with war ships and
transportation carriers were to land

a

strong French force

in Northern Prussia which was to act in a holding manner

against the Prussian forces.

The key factor in the French

plan was the quickness in which the major part of the French
army assembled around Alsace.

However, as it later proved.

76, John F, C. Fuller, "The Period of German Consolidation,
1861-1871," in Gordon B. Turner, ed. , A History
of Military Affairs . Mew York: Harcourt, Brace
Company, 1953, p. 210, Also see appendix I..
The French army in 1870 probably had a much
better organization than it had had in 1796 but
the military leaders at this later date were
found lacking in the ways of military theory.
This can be seen in the French military's plan
to occupy Prussia in 1870.
.

77. Oncken, Napoleon III

,

p. 205t206,

Also see appendix II.
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the rail trcinsportation was found very inadequate
and only

about 100,000 troops were able to be transported
to Strasbourg, the center of the French preparations, while
about

150,000 men had to leave the trains ^Metz until further
78
provisions could be made for them.

When Napoleon

HI

arrived at Metz, a week after the

start of the war, he found whole regiments incomplete, and

entire divisions had not been heard from.

Napoleon, real-

izing the importance of an early French attack, ordered

his armies to attack, but his generals pointed out that
this would be impossible because of the various conditions.

Thus, France allowed its one chance for a quick military

victory to slip from its grasp.

In the end, French leaders

realized that they would not be fighting an offensive war,
79
but rather a defensive one.
The French military leaders in 1870 apparently failed
to recognize

that the fundamental base of the Napoleonic

military tradition rested on the victorious offensive.

If

they did recognize this principle they disregarded it, and

in addition disregarded the temperament of the individual

French soldier who was at his best in offense and hand to

hand fighting.

Instead, the French leaders viewed the recent

developments of the"mi trailleuse"and the "chassepot" with

78. Moltke, Franco-German War , pp. 3-4.

79. Ibid., p.

5.

59.

their long range and rapid fire
power as a growth toward
a defensive type of fighting
emphasized by favorable positions.
Thus, the French military
leaders failed to aceept
the
Napoleonic tradition of offense and
became entranced with
^°
the military school of defensive
positions.

lack of an agency, a general staff,
with a central
power to coordinate the various military
movements can often
be decisive, as was possibly
the case in France
-rhe

in 1870.

The comraand of the French armies
fell to different individ-

uals at various times and often during
disadvantagous periods.
All the French military commanders had
to consider
the im-

portance of Paris in any defensive plans and
in this respect
they were forced to limit their thinking.
These political
pressures upon the military tactics can best
be illustrated
later when we view the fall of Sedan.

Although the French lacked all adequate preparations
for
war France »s diplomatic actions previous to
1870 gave no

indication of these inadequacies.

When France vetoed the

unification of the northern and southern Germanic states,
preventing the formation of a German confederation, old fears
were aroused in Germany,
against Napoleon

I

The old memories of their struggle

and the futile attempts of Napoleon III to

gain concessions stirred a desire to »liberate' the Germanic
peoples of Alsace-Lorraine, 81 The first incident that would

80, Althara, Principles , p. 18.

81. Robert H. Lord, The Origins of the War of 1870 . Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1924, pp, 10-11, Hereafter cited as Lord, War of 1870,
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set the stage for what finally burst
in 1870, was laid in
1866.

By early 1870, Bismarck believed
that Napoleon III

wanted the Germans to be in a position
of accepting either
war or humiliation. His views of the
fanatical remarks by

some of the French representatives in
their chamber and by
the French press seemed to strengthen
his opinion that war
82
was inevitable.
This belief on the part of Bismarck only

left little room for rational action.

When the Hohenzollern incident occurred the Paris
newspapers were filled with articles on how the French
government

should have used force in preventing this German
"outrage",

even itr it^ was necessary for France to go to war.
.

.
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The

moderation of a few French officials, led by Napoleon III,
seemed to act as a calming force during this early stage
of hysteria.

After a time it seemed that this incident had been
settled peacefully, but later, when the French Ambassador
Benedetti and the Prussian King William met, their meeting
became greatly exaggerated out of true proportions by various
French elements, apparently to stir and agitate the French
84
populace.
On the Prussian side, Bismarck, who was at a

82. Emile Ollivier, The Franco^Prussian War and its Hidd en
Causes . Boston: Little, Brown Company, 1912, p. 461.
Hereafter cited as Ollivier, Franco-Prussian War .
83. Washburne, Recollections, p. 29.

84. Ibid,, p. 33,
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meeting with von Moltke and von Roon, received the
original

telegram from King William of Prussia telling of the
meeting between him and the French ambassador.

All three Prus-

sians became discouraged that the last opportunity to
go to

war with France was evaporating,

Bismarck then hit upon

the scheme of editing the now famous

Eras

that would make war almost inevitable.

dispatch in a way

85

To the neutral observer it would appear that certain

powerful segments within

French society were also wt

determined to have w a r^^ along with their Prussian counterparts.

The adventurers and plotters who surrounded the

Emperor seemed to have used their influence to arouse the
feelings for war.

In all probability, Napoleon III never

,

wanted the war since he had recently been quite successful
in bring about a series of liberal reforms.

The elements

that desired war with Prussia finally carried the day, and

war was declared.

After the declaration of war^ the firat months wes
to try to build the

fighting units.

used

unprepared French armies into successful

The French troops were as brave and as

capable of patriotic sacrifice as their Prussian rivals.
It is incorrect to assume that the French troops lacked any
of the basic skills and valor of any other soldiers of this

85. Ollivier, The Franco-Prussian War , p. 482.
appendix III,
86, Washburne, Recollections , p.

34.

Also see
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period.

The fact was, however, that the campaign of 1870
was

a classic example of the uselessness of valor and
patriotic

effort when there was a ^redt

Le

lack of technological and

military preparations, and a weakness of leadership.

This

is even truer when the rival force has an efficient and

well oiled military machine that has kept attuned to the
recent scientific innovations through which maximum benefit

can be gained through the central control of an efficient

general staff.
Up until this time. Napoleon III had been successful
at getting the French people to view him as his uncle's

worthy successor.

His name allowed him to gain military

acclaim when in reality he had little right to it.

He had

based his true power on political diplomacy rather than

military ability.

The generals to whom he frequently gave

command positions were loyal to him, or had become antiquated.

Although universal military training had been reinstituted
a huge section of the male population was still exempt from

conscription.

The majority of the reserves who were to be

used to bolster the professional army wete inadequate.

The

railroads were almost completely ill-prepared for mobilization.

Many of the minor military articles, like boots^ and

clothing^were missing.

As the final inadequacy, decisive

above all previous points, there was found to be an utter

lack of competent commanders.
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THE WAR OF 1870

On July 23, 1870 the first Prussian
division crossed
the French frontier, and began to march
in the general
direction of St. Avoid. This could be considered

the first

step in the systematic Prussian invasion
of France.

Napoleon

III assumed direct command of the French
troops in the area

of St. Avoid.

On July 31, when the French and Prussian

advance posts met in Saarbruck, the small
skirmish that resulted was viewed as a great French victory.
The error of

Louis Napoleon in not demanding a continuous French
drive into southern Germany, despite the fact that
his leading

generals

had opposed it, lost the last opportunity the French
had for
87

victory.

Yet it was still feasible, if Napoleon III had

had the military ability of his uncle, for the French to

launch an attack with a force made up of a few infantry

divisions and Frossard's cavalry divisions, into some of the

Rhenish provinces.

Thus, they could have blockaded Saar-

louis, driven back the weak Prussian forces in that area,

and established strong defensive positions around Kreuznach,

From these positions the French could have assaulted the

German forces, while hindering the movements of the larger

German army by destroying the railroads.

These victories

would have given the French the precious time they needed
88

while improving French morale.

This lack of French mobility

and preoccupation with defensive measures was to prove fatal.

87. Although it is unlikely that Napoleon I would ever have
allowed himself to be so ill-prepared; had he found
himself in the situation in 1870, it would be quite
doubtful that he would have missed the opportunity.
88. Soguslawski, Tactical Deductions, pp. 47-48.
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At the outbreak of the war the
strongest element in favor
of the French was the bravery of
the individual French soldier.
During the era of the first Napoleon
the French fighting man
had proven himself capable and honorable.
He continued this

tradition throughout the following years
in the battles of
Sebastopol and Solferino and immediately
preceding 1870.
The Germans who opposed the professional
French troops,
until they nearly disappeared during the
latter half of
1870, had great respect for the French infantry and
real-

ized how ivell they deserved the reputation
that tradition
89

had given them.
This well-founded confidence in the supremacy
of the
French army was prevalent not only in France but
in many

other areas, such as Luxembourg.

When some Prussian troops

has shot the mayor of Wissembourg, the comment was made
that
the French troops would very soon teach the Prussians
a
90

lesson.
The optimistic Frenchman, even after the war, felt that

his nation still had had the chance of military victory.

This view pointed

to

the weakness of the military leadership

as the cause for the defeat in 1870.

It was supposed that if

the French array had crossed the Saar with the numerical

superiority, which in theory it had until August 15th, Itey

could have defeated the Prussian troops in Palatinate before

89, Hohenlohe, Infantry , p. 4.

90. W, H. Russell, My Diary During The Last Great War . New
York: Routledge, 1874, p. 55, Hereafter cited as
Russell, Pi ary ,
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von Moltke was able to implement
his plan.

This opinion

also reasoned that even after September
16th,had the French
leaders been intelligent enough to withdraw
toward Paris

instead of Sedan,the results of the war
could have been
quite different.

This great self-confidence on the part
of Frenchmen in
general was one thing, but the same view
on the part of the
French military leaders often led, a+ the
start of the war,
to very lax reconnaissance.
They failed to use their cavalry
for this purpose and thus neglected one
of the basic Napoleonic principles.
The German armies in 1870 made extensive use
of their

cavalry for reconnoi tering purposes.

Frequently, their

cavalry would move 15 to 20 miles in advance of the
main

German units.
I

This tactic was similar to that of K^apoleon

who, when in doubt as to the enemy »s movements, would
often

send out reconnoi tering cavalry with definite orders to take

enemy prisoners in order to learn of his opponent's movements.
The French, on the other hand, until they were surprised
by the Prussians at Beaumont, frequently allowed the German

reconnaissance units to get close enough to the French camp
93
so that they could see the French activities in detail.

91. Ollivier, The Franco-Prussian War , pp. 395-396.
92. C. F. Clery, Minor Tactics . London: Paul, Trench, Trubner,
1896, pp. 42-46. hereafter cited as Clery, Tactics .
93. Ibid ., p. 47.
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In other respects, however, the cavalry was not used

extensively by either side in the Franco-Prussian War,

Although the German cavalry did an outstanding job of observing the French army movements they were rarely used to their
full potential as an attacking force against enemy infantry.

Occasionally, small numbers of cavalry were used in coordina.

tion with other elements of the army,
of cavalry were seldom used
I

e,s

However, large numbers

they had been earlier.

Napoleon

used large masses of cavalry divided into four or six

regiments,

iniiich

frequently attacked in two or three lines

almost equal in numbers,

Bonaparte usually attacked dis-

organized infantry at timely intervals with devastating
results.

The chaos which existed on the battlefields in 1870

could have similarly been used to advantage by the use of
large cavalry forces.

The factor of surprise, plus the

excellent natural cover found in the region of the fighting
in 1870^ could have provided either the French or German
94
cavalry with good opportunities for favorable attacks.

In any case, neither side used the cavalry as successfully
as it might have been used.

On August 6th the French military suffered two defeats.
The first occurred when the Germans drove Marshal MacMahon

from the heights around Worth while dealing him a loss of
6,000 men.

94, Ibid ,

,

During the same day. General Frossard*s troops,

pp.

372, 374-375.
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who held a strong defensive
position above Saarbruck, were
driven in mass confusion towards
Metz by another German
army.
After the French forces regrouped

in the vicinity of

Metz they fought several unsuccessful
battles around Metz
with only small losses. Finally,
Marshal Bazaine ordered
the retreat of the French forces
from Metz to Verdun, but
during the retreat his army suffered
a defeat near Gravelotte,

BATTLE OP MARS- LA-TOUR
During this phase of the fighting, Bazaine
failed to
abide by Napoleon I»s rule of thumb which
emphasized the

importance of avoiding any unnecessary delay
in time of
battle, because in certain instances a single
day»s delay
of plans could be disastrous.

In all probability, Bazaine

could have escaped from Metz if the Prussian 1st
and 2nd armies-; had followed through with

15th.

their plan to rest on August

It becomes evident that in this case the Prussians

were following the Napoleonic strategy, while on the other

hand Bazaine made the blunder of delaying his withdrawal one
95

complete day,

thereby making the French withdrawal extreme-

ly treacherous.

By August 14th the French army, under Bazaine, was

located east of Metz confronting the German 1st army, while

95. Baron von Goltz, The Conducts of War . Kansas City, Mo.
Franklin Hudson Company, 1896, p. 67, Hereafter
cited as Goltz, Conducts.
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the German 2nd army was
advancing on Moselle to the
south.''
Only the slowness of Bazaine's
reaction to von Koltke's

over-extended advance guard saved
it from being isolated
and
destroyed,
this instance von Moltke was
saved from destruc

m

tion by the individual action
of some of his subordinates,
and
seems to have unwittingly made
use of the Kapoleonic
principle
of the necessity of an advance
guard furiously attacking the
enemy, thereby drawing their
attention and allowing for

greater flexibility in the movements
by the larger part of
the army.

On August 16th, the Prussian
vanguard attacked the French
army, commanded by Bazaine,
thinking that it was merely the
rearguard for the French withdrawal
to the north.
When
Prince Frederick Charles arrived on the
scene and realized
that his army was opposed by Bazaine
»s entire 140,000 men,
he ordered that continuous pressure
be applied by the German
left flank while the right flank held
its position,
Although
the Prussian advance guard had over-extended
itself^ their

good system of communications facilitated the swift
movement
of troops into the areas desir^ At times
it may

have appear-

ed that the German 1st and 2nd armies were moving
in

a line

not connecting the 3rd army, but in reality they had a
common
base on the Rhine River, from Coblentz to Germersheim,
while

96, Ibid ., p. 124.
97, Clausewitz, On War . Vol. I, p, 264.
98,

whi tton

Decisive BattleS:^

p , 153,
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their flankers were never farther than one day»s march
from
each other.

Although when the complete armies confronted

each other the French were usually numerically inferior,
they seldom made any attempt to concentrate a more numerous

force in a particular area, which would have enabled them to

separate and aefeat the isolated German forces.

coming is

ber.t

99

This short-

illustrated during the battle on August 16th

at Mars-la-Tour.

The German right flank firmly held its

position with the help of heavy artillery while occasionally attempting to defeat small sections of the French line.

Bazaine concentrated most of his reinforcements in this
area since he feared that he might be cut off from Metz.
Due to the great number of German artillery pieces on this
flank, all attempts by the fresh French troops in this sector
100
were in vain.

This situation had resulted because of Bazaine

*s late

decision to move in the direction of Verdun, but the decision
also over-extended the German forces who were trying to cut

off the French route to Verdun.

The German 2nd Corps at

Flavigny faced not only the French Batailles division of the
French 2nd Corps, but also the entire 6th Corps.

The German

3rd Corps was not only completely committed but had previously suffered heavy casualties in earlier fighting.

The only

99. Edward B. Haraley, The Operations of War . London: Blackwood and Sons, 1878, p. 324. Hereafter cited as

Hamley, Operations .
100. Whitton, Decisive Battles , p. 154.
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other German Corps close
enough to provide any
assistance
the loth Corps, was
still a great distance
away. The French
forces at this ti™e were
also being strengthened
by the

arrival of the 3rd and 4th
Corps and. as a result,
could
easily have swept the German
left flank while rolling
up
the German line as it
moved forward. The only
thing the
French needed was a commander
who had the vision to
see and
understand the complex situation,
and then give the necessary
orders which could only have
climated in victory,

m

any

case. Bazaine, because of
the hugeness of the
conflict, was
unable to rise to the opportunity.
He was thinking more
along the lines of a defensive
strategy and greatly feared
that his base of operations,
Metz. would be cut off.^°^
During the fighting the German
left flank remained
fluid for the entire day. About
half of the German 19th
Division of the 10th Corps arrived
in the vicinity of Marsla-Tour and was immediately ordered
to assist the German
3rd Corps by attacking the French
right flank. This half
of the 10th Division, made up of
five battalions of Guard
Dragoons, advanced across almost completely
open ground

in front of the French right flank.

Within a short period

this German force was shattered, with its
remmants falling

back to Tronville.

The French attempted to follow
up their

success but their hesitancy to throw
in greater numbers of

71.

reinforcements made their attempt
preordained to failure.
A little later. General von
Rheinbaben, colander of the

German 5th Cavalry Division
attempted to envelop^the
French
right wing. Although the French
had almost
three full

cavalry divisions located nearby
they failed to make maximum
use of all of their forces by
holding many in reserve. As
a result, the French were
forced to withdraw to Bruville
while the Prussians had won the
103
important element of time.
The remaining day was primarily
of a stationary nature with
both sides making occasional
assaults on each other's
posi tions.

importance of the battle of Mars-la-Tour
was that the
French military leaders missed a great opportunity.
The
I^ie

fewer

German forces not only successfully stopped the
French retreat
but allowed enough time for the main German
force
to

intercede

between the two French armies of Bazaine and
MacMahon, thus
^^'^
ending the French hope of combining their
two
armies.

Bazaine had failed to dislodge the German advance
guard and
had decided against a more circuitous route
west and thus
fell back under the covering guns of Meti:.

After the battle

of Gravelotte on August 18th the French army, commanded
by

102. Envelopment is an attack made on one or both of the
enemy »s flanks or rear, usually accompanied by an
attack on his front,
103. Whitton, Decisive Battles , pp. 154-155,
104. Ibid .

.

p.

156.
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aazaine, had been fairly well cut
off from the rest of France"!
The fact remained that the German
view, even after
August 18th, was not ,o optimistic
as most observers would
have believed. The official German
account of this period
of the fighting indicated that
Bazaine still had excellent
opportunities to break out of Metz as late
as August 31st.
If this account was accurate, how
much more favorable would
his chances have been eleven or twelve
days earlier when
the German forces were extremely
scattered
in the south, is

open now only to speculation.

This German account describes

the possibility on August 31st of
Bazaine»s breakout from

Metz to the south as follows:
"Far fewer difficulties were presented by the
local
conditions to the south of Metz. A forward movement
on this side would find in that terrain, as
on the
northeast, a large space for development upon both
banks of the Seille, along the three great roads to
Soigne, Nomeny, and Cheminot. Should the bulk of
the
army of the Rhine make a sudden dash along these
roads,
while a left detachment shaped its course for Courcelles
sur Nied; and a second, under the protection of the
fortress-artillery, showed front towards Ars and Jouy
somewhere in the neighborhood of Frescaty, in order
to detain the VII and VIII Prussian Corps in the passage of the Moselle, there was, in view of the position
at that time of the investing army, and that too without any very severe struggle. It is true that the
French leaders would have been forced in any case to
abandon their trains, and even then would have been
sooner or later threatened in flank and rear by the
forward pressure of the Corps of the investing army.
But Marshal Bazaine might hope in all cases to find
his line of march at any rate open, to sever temporarily the but weakly guarded communications of the
Germans, and, although not without considerable difficulties as to supply, to escape with a large part of
his army to the southward. "J-Oo

105, Goltz, Conduct , p. 125.

106, Boguslawski, Tactical Deductions , p. 128.
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BATTLE OF SEDaN
As previously mentioned, when Marshal MacMahon
took
comraand of the retreating French troops who
had been beaten

at Geisburg,

and ordered them to re-group and fight at
Worth

on August 6th, approximately 32,000 French
troops met the

40,000 Prussians at Worth,

Eventual German victory quickly

became evident due to the Prussians' superiority of
numbers.
In this clash, as in many of the previous ones, the
Prussians

continued to be victorious, but also lost many men because
they continued to charge in mass formations.

The Germans would frequently carry the day on sheer

numbers alone no matter what kind of superior position or
courage the French troops showed.

MacMahon, with his small

army slightly reinforced, fell back from Worth and retreated

toward Nancy.

As MacMahon slowly withdrew, it became evident

that the famous French legend concerning French ability to

improvise was not entirely untrue.

Nearly 100,000 troops

from various groups were gathered with their equipment under
the command of MacMahon,

In all probability, the number

and valor of these men were adequate, but supplies of med-

icine, communications and artillery were either^ totally lacking or insufficient.

of Napoleon

I

With a great commander of the stature

this army, with its nucleus of trained profes-

sional infantrymen, could have taken a heavy toll of the

107, Moltke, The Franco-German War, p. 12.
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German forces.

Napoleon

I

Even a leader of far less ability than

should have been able to hold his position
at

least long enough for Bazaine to start an
offensive action,
and possibly long enough for a third
French army to be
108
formed in Paris.
Had not Napoleon I during his last

Hundred Days, and in fact after his defeat in
1812, used the
same type of raw recruit to hold the larger
more experienced

armies of the allies to a stand^still?

m

was not Napoleon 1, and tbereiore it

^rob,

fiui.

.e

ir,

any case, MacMahon

Mv

unfair to

the COM' aricion,

MacMahon's first plan to fight a delaying action while
retreating from Chalons had to be changed when Comte de
Palikao, Minister of War, telegraphed that a revolution

would take place in Paris if MacMahon abandoned Bazaine.
Not desiring to act against the orders of Palikao, MacMahon
ike

ordered his army to march towardAMeuse with the chance that
Bazaine might be able to unite with him.

This interference

by politicians could never have occurred under Napoleon

I

since political repercussions seldom influenced his military

strategy.

Napoleon

I

was concerned, first and foremost, with

military tactics, as Moltke showed himself to be in 1870.

As a result, weak politics had left France unprepared for war;

weaker politics were then to destroy possibly the last chance
that France had of averting defeat.

108. Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, p. 185.
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MacMahon not only was weakened by various political
pressures on him, but also apparently forgot one of
Napoleon
I»s key tactical maneuvers; avoiding the danger of a
flanking movement while within striking distance of the
enemy,

MacMahon»s retreat, which was of a defensive nature, from
Meuse on August 30th, 1870 was completely opoosite^^^Tapoleon

Bonaparte »s retreat from Leipzig in 1813.

109

Napoleon

I

had

110

always argued that the use of a flank march when within

attacking aistance of the enemy was completely foolish,

although sometimes more convenient than the traditional

column movement.

MacMahon broke this tactic when he used

a flank ruarch in front of the enemy position held by the

German Crown Prince.

MacMahon had hoped he could force

march his troops to Sedan so that they might be united

with the forces under Bazaine.

Because his troops could

not move as quickly as was necessary, MacMahon *s force was

stopped and then attacked while in the flanking movement.

This blunder was to lead to the disaster of Sedan which
111

soon followed.

109, Clausewitz, On War , Vol, I, p, 304,
Napoleon I, with about 35,000 men, could possibly
have avoided the battle that resulted at Hanau by
trying to pass the Rhine at either Coblenz or ManInstead he proved that certain elements,
nheim,
such as the defense of a chosen terrain, could prove
quite advantageous to a retreating army. On Oct, 30,
1813, the Bavarian army of 50,000 tried to block
his retreat at Hanau, By the brillant use of his
artillery he blew apart the enemy lines and continued his withdrawal,
110, Flank march takes place when a unit moves to the left or right.
111, Clausewitz, On War , Vol, I, p. 88.
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On August 31st, the German army overtook MacMahon's
troop
a short distance north of the Rheims River.

After a fierce

battle they drove the French army toward Sedan.

During the

entire day there was a continuous series of bloody skirmishes
as the French troops, pressed on every side, fell back
ex112
hausted into Sedan,

September 1st found the French surrounded and all avenues
of escape cut off.

They were crowded together in a narrow

area, v;hile five hundred Prussian artillery pieces fired at
113
point blank range.

Above all things, the German victory at Sedan was a

German artillery victory over French artillery.

The French

paid no attention to the Napoleonic principle of massing
artillery pieces for concentrated fire power and, as

were completely silenced by the German guns,

a result,

hot only did

the French use their artillery by independent batteries,

but they even failed to have any conceivable plan or pattern
114
in which these batteries were to be used.
With this victory
of the German artillery, came the collapse of the French

resistance.

112. John Abbott, Prussia and the Franco-Pruss ian War. Boston:
B. B, Russel, 1871, p. 241.
Hereafter cited as

Abbott, Prussia , p
113. Moltke, The Franco-German War , p. 256.
114. Boguslawski, Tactical Deductions , p. 78,
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When MacMahon was wounded at Sedan he was succeeded
by Marshal Ducrot as comraander of the French
troops.

Just

as Ducrot was to attempt to break out of Sedan
he was re-

lieved of his command by General VJimpffen, who brought
new
orders from the War Minister in Paris. Wimpffen
failed to

take stock of the existing situation until
it was too late^^^

This incident merely shows how the continual
political

pressures from Paris hindered the military effort of the

men doing the fighting.
After twelve hours of this unequal struggle, the French

commanders reported to the emperor that they could no longer
116

offer serious resistance.

When surrender became inevitable,

Napoleon III assumed full responsibility and ordered the
French to surrender.

In all reality the fall of Sedan meant the end of the war,
and any chajice that France might have had to be victorious.

Bismarck, on the following day, September

marized the facts in

a letter

3,

1870, fully sum-

to his wife: "Yesterday and the

day previous, therefore, have cost France a hundred thousand

men and an Emperor.

Today the latter, with all his attend-

ants, horses, and carriages, have started for Wilhelmshc)he

near Cassel.

This is a great historical event

-

a victory

for which we must humbly give God the glory, and which ends
the war, even if we have to carry it further against the
117
country deprived of its leaders,"

115, George F. Henderson, The Science of Wa r, Yorkshire-Lancaster Regiment: Gale Pollelk, 1891, pp. 401-402,
116, Abbott, Prussia , p, 256,
117, Hayward, Bismarck, pp, 274-275.
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CAUSES OF DEFEAT
The eighteenth century military theorists,
led by

Napoleon I, had constantly striven for great
speed and

decisiveness in warfare.

Although Napoleon

I

had success-

fully used this type of warfare in achieving
military victor,
ies, he had failed to establish a lasting peace
in Europe
for various other reasons.

Napoleon

I

never desired a

balance of forces within Europe; rather he had tried
to
set up a system of peace dependent upon himself and
his

military victories.

This could not last since the peace

was entirely dependent on Napoleon who, as a human being,
could not live forever.

It was also questionable if France,

the nation, had the ability or desire to sustain this type

of peace for any
to limit the

l^thy period.

The failure of Napoleon

I

power and the influence of Great Britain must

also be considered one of the leading reasons forj'not achieving peace in Europe.

The continued independence of England

allowed her to assist both Napoleon»s domestic and foreign
enemies.

Napoleon III, on the other hand, trying to apply

the Napoleonic tradition of a Europe dominated by France,

met many of the same difficulties that his uncle had met

before him.

Although Napoleon III lacked the military

decisiveness of his uncle, his army had done an adequate job
in consolidating French influence up to 1870.

In fact,

Napoleon III out did his uncle when he realized the error

79.

of not containing English
influence.

This neutralization

of active British support of
France's enemies became one of
the mainstays of Napoleon IIl»s
foreign policy. Only in the
latter stages of his reign did he
fail to cultivate the
friendship of Britain. This point
proved decisive since it
assured British neutrality during
1870-1871 even though the

majority of the British populace sympathized
with the French
nation. Bismarck not only tried to
continually avoid any
friction with Britain, but he also tried
after the German
victory to create a peace that was, at
least on the surface,

based not only on military conquest, but
also had a facade of
having the general consent of the people.
Although he failed
on this point, primarily because of the nlsace
question, the

fact remains that the only reason that Moltke»s
military

victories were not to remain isolated battles was due
entirely to the great statesmanship of Bismarck.

The peace he

arranged did not last forever, but it was successful
over
a short period of time.

It is incorrect to conclude that the only cause of the

French defeat in 1870 was wholly the responsibility of the
French military.

The French defeat in 1870, similar to that

of the Prussians at Jena in 1806, v;as the product of many

and various elements within both societies.

The Prussians

in 1806 were a classic example of a highly disciplined, elite

118, Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, p, 454,
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army which was the product of
its Junker society.

Napoleon

I, with his new applications of
warfare, such as the use of

mass armies, showed the Prussians
the necessity
change.
In 1870, the roles were exactly
reversed.
Von Moltke, with

his new innovations, showed the
French people that their
18th century army left a great deal
to be desired.
Even
though the French army was one of
the best fighting forces
of the period it was obvious that
in the future it had
to be

patterned along the modern 19th century lines
of the
Prussian army. The success of the Third
Republic indicates
not only a political change after 1870, but
also a social

change.

Many Frenchmen woke to the reality that
Prussia had

not only gained on France militarily, but also
culturally,

economically, and technologically; whereas the nation
under

Napoleon III had remained rather stationary in various
areas
in addition to the military.

If the French military was not the only cause of French

defeat in 1870, in all probability it
ity of the burden.

must bear the major-

Most of the military minds followed the

lead of a few outstanding individuals like du Picq, while
their personal experiences in France s various campaigns

reinforced these views.

As a child is limited in his

development to his environment, so also were the French

military leaders limited to their own experiences.

The
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isolated battles and campaigns against
various backward
peoples were not conducive to the development

of many new

military tactics.

In all of these earlier campaigns
the

valorous tradition of heroism of the French
soldier which
went back to the Napoleonic Era, continued
without break.
The most important quality that the French
army lacked in
1870,

as was previously seen in light of earlier
campaigns,

was in the area of military theory.

The regulations that

governed the French army during 1870 were none other than
those that the Prussians had discarded after the battle
of

Jena in 1806.

Due to the fact that France »s armies had a

continuous chain of victories, starting from the most impressive in 1854, the French military considered itself the
119

best in the world.
The real weakness of the French army lay in the fact that
it completely lacked any advanced and sophisticated course in

tactics for its officers.

Since the only courses French

officers did receive were of a basic introductory nature few
officers rose to anything more than subordinate field officers
in their knowledge of military strategy and tactics.

When

it came time to appoint commanders it was necessary to appoint

individuals who were probably quite qualified on the lower
practical levels, but who were completely unschooled in
knowledge of general tactics.

a

In fact. Napoleon III, because

119. Emile Laloy," French Military Theory," The Military Hist
orian and Economist , Vol, II, No, 3, July 1917, p,
267, Hereafter cited as Laloy, Theory .
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he felt it necessary to play the role of
heir to his uncle»s

military genius, TA*iile in reality he knew little about
military
theory, avoided a great deal of conversation on
military

tactics that might possibly have shown his ignorance
in
that area.

Because of this, it frequently became necessary

for the military commanders to rely on flash
inspirations in
time of battle, rather than on previous tactical
plans that
120
had not been formulated in any great detail.

During 1870 French strategists seemed unmindful of the
changes that had taken place since the time of Napoleon
Bonaparte,

These developments were readily absorbed by the

Germans who realized more fully the effect of the breech
loading rifle on both tactics and movement of troops.

121

These Prussian insights and subsequent improvement in their

military strategy and organization, while the French re-

mained completely static, were important factors in the
outcome of the war between the two countries.

120. Ibid ,

,

p, 268,

121, 3oguslawski, Tactical Deductions, p, 175,
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CONCLUSION
The fighting in 187r, started with both nations
possessing professional armies and, at least nominally, ready
for
war.

The commands on both sides made various miscalculations

and mistakes, but the Germans took advantage of their
enemy's

errors more than did the French.

Despite the fact that the

German plan of attack was not at all sophisticated or subtle,
and relied on sheer massing of force, it was victorious.

This war^

iaust be

122

considered one of the most bitter,

decisive, and most consequential wars of Europe since the
days of Napoleon I.

To Germany this war still represents

some of the most glorious chapters of its national history;

123

whereas to France this period stands out as one of the most
humiliating in its long national history.
In the final analysis, it would seem that it was the

Napoleonic military system and tradition, developed, pruned,
and efficiently used by the German military leaders, that
124
quickly crushed the French armies in 1870.
The military genius of von Moltke was, in a sense, not
as great as that of Napoleon I.

Moltke

*s

main interest and

ability lay in the fact that he could develop excellent

general tactics, and was able to organize an administration

122. Liddell Hart, Strategy . New York: Praeger, 1962, p. 154.
123. Lord, War of 1870 . p. 3.

124. F. N. Maude, Letters on Tactics and Organization . Kansas
Spooner, 1891, p. 35.
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that could carry out these tactics.

In a true sense he was

the first of the great modern generals.

The German victories

were not due to the immediate commanders,
as the Napoleonic

victories of 1800-1814 had been.

The German military strength

came from a detailed military organization,
better military

education of their officers, and from their frequent
numerical
superiority.

These very characteristics were to become the

most important concern of the modern armies today.

The

importance of numerical superiority forced the demise
of the
small elite professional armies of the past.

Instead, the

German system of a "nation in arms" revolutionized the
military
tradition in Europe, so that the entire male population of
a nation was trained,

armed, and could be concentrated at
125
any one point within a few days.
Many of these qualities

of a modern army can easily be viewed as the logical out-

come of Napoleonic tactics.
The responsibilities of the war itself must rest with

both sides.

In the case of France, the Napoleonic tradition

made war almost inevitable by its continuing policy of

frustrating the attempts at unification by the southern and

northern Germanic states.

France had intervened in German

domestic affairs after the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 in
an effort to prevent such unification.

Napoleon Ill^during the later stages of his government^
allowed French leadership to fall into the hands of Ollivier

125. Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, p. 455.
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and Gramont, who were a poor match for
the crafty Bismarck,
If Napoleon III had been at his peak
of power, as he had
been during the early 1850 's, the turn of
events might
have been different. What occurred under
Napoleon lU

would probably not have taken place under his
uncle, since
the first Napoleon could never bring
himself to
designate

any great amount of power to any of his
subordinates.

In

ordinary times Napoleon III probably would have
been the
most powerful force in Europe, but as an opponent
of Bismarck, he was found lacking.

Napoleon Ill's error was not

entirely due to his lack of military knowledge, but was
due
largely to the fact that by the late 1860
true complete authority of a dictator.

's he

lacked the

However, because

many considered him so, it was necessary for him to accept
the mistakes that did not entirely belong to him.

In all

reality, he was the product of his times: the results of the

desires of the French people to continue the glorious myth
of the Napoleonic Empire.

On the other hand, they refused

to support it financially or militarily to the extent that

would have made it

a

success.

The difference between the

two Napoleons in this area was notic^ble in that Napoleon
III asked for the people's support, while Napoleon

I

demand-

ed it.
In addition, the military leaders themselves failed to

hold true to the Napoleonic tradition at its best.

They
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lacked the foresight to realize the important
lessons of

Napoleon

I

and, in fact, in several instances acted
in com-

plete opposition to the old master.

Perhaps this failure is

basically due to the well worn rule that few men ever
realize
the importance of various things which they
have grown and

developed beneath their own roof.

Possibly they thought

that since the Napoleonic tradition belonged to them
it

would remain with them forever despite changing conditions
and times.

The French military leaders had failed to hold

true to Napoleon I»s most precious principle:

the constant

need for change of military strategy to fit the different
situations.

They were only pragmatic to the point that they

concluded that their victories in 1854, 1859 and 1862 were
good enough examples of their military prowess to preclude
the necessity for any change.

These same military leaders

failed to see the underlying weakness of most of these
victories.
In any case, both Napoleon III and the French military

strategists merely reflected the French society of their
time, to a lesser or greater degree.

In the final analysis,

the blame must fall on French society for the failure of the

Napoleonic tradition during the Second Empire,

The French

people paid lip service to the glories of the First Empire
and the military victories of the first Napoleon,

However,

had Napoleon III tried to continue his uncle's exploits on a
great scale he probably would have met strong opposition
and possibly even been overthrown.

The result was a feeling
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that prevailed throughout French society, the
government, and
the military which was conducive to an
exterior of glamor and

glitter, although beneath the surface lay laxness
and dis-

interest.

I

am inclined to agree with the general trend

among many recent historians that the positive
aspects of the

reign of Louis Mapoleon outweighed the negative points.

Had

his years ended with victory insteaa of defeat, earlier

historians would have been much more likely to have consider126

ed his reign

a

success,

Prussia, in all probability, carried out the Napoleonic

tradition much farther than the very country that had borne

its founder.

In the form of Bismarck, Prussia had a man who

was probably even more brilliant than Napoleon
ly.

I

diplomatical-

Bismarck believed as fervently as Bonaparte that any

device should be used to reach the desired ends.

Although

both men probably emphasized this pragmatic approach, Bismarck,

being more skilled in the use of these diplomatic tools,

would have won the fervent approval of Napoleon I.

Von Moltke,

on the other hand, was probably not as skilled a military

genius as was Bonaparte, yet he finished the required job

efficiently and successfully.

Moltke, while a more conservative

militarist than Napoleon Bonaparte, would probably have been

Napoleon *s equal in the modern warfare of the 19th century.

126. Spitzer, Napoleon III , pp. 308-310.
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It is quite possible that Moltke
might even have beaten

Napoleon

I

on the modern battlefield, since
warfare had

become a science and the best commander
was frequently the
one most skilled with the various
tools of modern warfare
and having the ability to organize
them so that maximum
efficiency could be acquired.
The Franco-Prussian War saw the arming of
huge masses

of men with weapons that had been provided
by the recent

growth of industrialization.

They were led to war by military

leaders who had absorbed and improved upon the
traditions and

strategies of Napoleon Bonaparte.

Modern war had been made

possible, and the era of Napoleon I, when one individual

could do all jobs well, had come to an end.
specialist had begun, with the need for

a

The time of the

commander-in-chief

who observed the combat from a distance, while simultaneously

planning future strategy.
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APPENDIX

I

Emperor Napoleon III to General Lebrun on the general plan
of war.

November, 1869

"Oh, reprit l»Empereur, on pourrait pourtant etablir
ce plan sans y faire entrer d« alliance sures ou probables.

Mais, au surplus, il serait permis de considerer I'alliance
d 'Italic, comme certaine, et celle de I'Autriche comme
127
^
assuree raoralement, sinon activement,"

127. Cncken, Napoleon III , p. 204,
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APPENDIX II
°"
deliberations of the French
''''' "'^^
^^^^^ ^a^ole'^r

cnnn^,-/^^^''^''^^

nrin'the ^hair!

.^.."L»Iimpereur exprimait ensuite son
opinion personelle, se
declara favorable k un plan de campagne
qui reposerait sur les
donnees suivantes. . . .La guerre etant
declar^e. trois armies,
de 100,000 hommes chacune, I'une
fran^aise, une autre autrichienne et la troisieme italienne,
envahiraient aussitot la

territoire du midi de

1

'allemagne.

Les trois armees auraient

pour premier objectif un point central
du territoire de ces
Etats. Elles s»y concentreraient sous
le commanderaent d»un
generalissirae designe d'avance par les trois
souverains

interesses.

Sur les 300,000 hommes reunis ainsi, un corps
de

30 a 40,000 Italiens serait jete a Munich pour occuper,
en

permanence, cette capitale de la Baviere.

Au moyen de ces

premieres dispositions, on pouvait esperer que l«on detacherait
de la Prusse les forces de la Baviere, du Wurtoraberg
et du

Grand-Duche de Bade.... Ce premier resultat obtenu, I'arraee
alliee, diminuee des 40,000 Italiens laisses a Munich, se

dirigerait vers le haut Mein pour aller prendre pied en
Franconie et s»y etablir sur une base d'operations s»entendant
de Wurtzbourg a Nuremberg ou Amberg.

C»est de cette base

qu»elle partirait ensuite pour commencer les grandes operations
128
de la campagne."

128. Ibid., pp. 205-206
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APPENDIX III
The Ems dispatch sent from the King of Prussia, July 13,
1870, to Bismarck.
The original version, Ko, 27, No, 61,
reads as follows:
"M. Benedetti accosted me on the promenade, in order to

demand of me - most importunately, at last, that
ize him to telegraph to Paris that

I

I

should author-

bind myself for all future

time never again to give my consent if the Hohenzollerns renew

that candidature.

I

repelled him at last somewhat severly,

for one may not and cannot make such commitments for ever and

ever (a tout jamais).

Naturally,

I

informed him that

I

had

received no news as yet, and, since he had been informed earlier
than

I

by way of Paris and Madrid, he could easily understand

that my Government had no hand in the matter.

Since then His Majesty has received a dispatch from the

Prince (Charles Anthony).

As His Majesty has informed Count

Benedetti that he was expecting news from the Prince, His
Majesty, because of the above mentioned demand, decided, in

consonance with the advice of Count Eulenberg and mine, not
to receive the French envoy again, and informed him through

an aide-de-camp on duty that His Majesty had received from

Paris, and had nothing further to say to the Ambassador.

His

Majesty leaves it to your excellency to determine whether or
not this new demand of Benedetti *s and its rejection should
not be communicated without delay to our representatives and
129
to the press."

129. Ollivier, The Franco-Prussian War,

p. 482.
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3ismarck»s edited version of the
German representatives and press Ems Dispatch sent tn th.
reads as follows!

^

"After the news of the renunciation
of the hereditary
Claim of the Prince of Hohenzollern
had been officially communicated to the imperial goverment
of Spain, the French

Ambassador at Ems made an additional
demand of His Majesty,
that he should authorize him to

telegraph to Paris that His

Majesty the King bound himself for
all future time never
again to give his consent if the
Hohenzollerns renew that
candidature.

His Majesty the King thereupon decided
not to
receive the French envoy again, and
informed him
through

an aide-de-camp on duty that His Majesty
had nothing further
130
to say to the Ambassador,"

130. Ibid .. p. 483.
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